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Abstract 
This thesis examines the notion of the European Union (EU) being a leader in 
international climate change (CC) politics. It aims at finding out whether the 
Union is indeed a leader in the area and how this leader role is constructed. As a 
leader is only a leader when it is perceived as such, the study takes into account a 
distinct role-theoretical approach that analyzes the self-image of the EU and 
perceptions of non-EU actors on the EU‘s leadership. Interviews and qualitative 
data of CC negotiators and diplomats both from the EU and third states serve as 
the main empirical material for this endeavour. While the EU is seen by both the 
EU and non-EU outsiders as a leader on CC that is pursuing a ‗soft‘ leadership 
strategy – a distinctive combination of structural and instrumental with directional 
leadership modes – there is some incongruence between the EU and others‘ 
perceptions regarding to specific elements of the leader role. The EU may 
therefore, I argue, be characterized as a strong and genuine but somewhat 
restricted leader in the climate regime.  
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Abbreviations   
AOSIS    Alliance of Small Island States 
CC    Climate Change 
CDM    Clean Development Mechanism 
COM Interviewee from the European Commission 
COP    Conference of Parties 
COUN Interviewee from the Council Secretariat  
DC    Developing Country 
EU  European Union 
EEA    European Environmental Agency 
GHG Greenhouse Gases 
ICN    International climate negotiations 
JI     Joint Implementation 
LDC    Least Developed Country 
MS   Member States (of the European Union) 
SIDS   Small Island Developing Countries 
UNFCCC    United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UNEP    (Interviewee from) United Nations Environmental Program  
WTO    World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
Note! The interview and survey sources are indicated by the name of the state that 
the interviewee is representing. For example, (Switzerland) after a sentence or 
quote indicates that the sentence refers to a remark by an interviewee or 
respondent from Switzerland. 
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1 Introduction* 
Since the early 1990ies, the European Union (EU) presents itself as a leader on 
climate change (CC). In the current post-Kyoto climate negotiations, it is ―leading 
global action to 2020 and beyond‖ (Commission 2009a) and ―has been at the 
forefront of efforts to combat climate change‖ (Commission 2008d). This 
description has been echoed by scholars that see Europe
1
 as a key actor with 
leadership capabilities despite some shortcomings and implementation difficulties 
(Oberthür 2007, Vogler 2005, Bretherton & Vogler 2006, Vanden Brande 2008a). 
The most obvious example of the emergence of European leadership in 
environmental diplomacy was witnessed when the EU circumvented the United 
States‘ (US) power to help shaping an international climate regime in form of the 
Kyoto Protocol (Vogler 2005, Falkner 2006, Bretherton & Vogler 2006). 
Moreover, the EU‘s climate policy actions at the domestic and international level, 
such as the ratification of the ‗climate and energy package‘ and the Kyoto 
protocol, accompanied by official EU-rhetoric consolidates the impression of a 
leader with major capacity in foreign environmental policy. Arguably, the EU has 
made considerable effort to show that it is a ‗green giant‘ - a heavy weight in 
global climate change and environmental policy (Vogler 2005).  
Against this background, this paper intends to shed light on the Union‘s 
international role as a leader in the area of international climate politics. The 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
negotiations on a post-Kyoto agreement represent a sound opportunity to assess 
the construction of the Union‘s environmental leadership role in the interplay with 
other international actors. 
The approach of this study deviates from the rich literature on the EU‘s 
leadership in environmental politics (Vogler 2005, Oberthür 2007, Vogler & 
Stephan 2007, Lacaste et. al. 2007), as its presents a unique analytical framework. 
Most studies do not take into account the perception of others
2
 in assessing the 
international role of the EU. This is surprising as the assessment of leadership 
needs to take into account that ―[a] leader is not only a party that fulfils theoretical 
criteria; a leader is one that is perceived as a leader‖ (Gupta & van der Grijp 
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2000:67, emphasis added). Hence, by extending the analysis of the Union‘s role 
from how the EU sees itself to how outsiders perceive the EU in climate politics, a 
thorough and fruitful theoretical assessment of the construction of the EU‘s 
leadership role can be conducted.  
1.1 Purpose and Contribution 
The general purpose of this thesis is to gain an in-depth understanding on the 
construction of the EU‘s international role as a leader on climate change (CC). 
This is a challenging area of research, which has gained considerable academic 
attention (e.g. Bretherton & Vogler 2006, Vanden Brande 2008a, Oberthür 2007). 
However, except for one article published almost a decade ago (Gupta & van der 
Grijp 2000), scholars have not yet systematically analyzed the European Union‘s 
role in climate change negotiations in relation to the perceptions of ‗others‘3. This 
is astonishing as this approach could enhance our understanding of the Union‘s 
role in climate politics and its external presence considerably, especially because 
third party actors‘ perceptions are necessary to fully assess the leader-role of the 
EU (Gupta & van der Grijp 2000:67). They also influence the EU‘s role 
construction and behaviour, which at the same time feeds back on the others‘ 
perceptions in a circular relation. For this reason, they enable an evaluation of the 
reception and performance of the EU‘s leadership in climate politics (compare 
Elgström 2006: 1, 12-13).  
How others see the EU in international politics is still an under researched area 
despite a growing body of literature on that issue (e.g. Elgström 2006, Elgström 
2007a, Elgström 2008, Chaban et. al. 2006, Lucarelli 2008, Cerutti & Lucarelli 
2008, Lightfoot & Hussey 2006). The present study contributes to this rather 
scarce set of academic writing by shedding some light on how Europe is 
perceived in the area of climate change politics. As the EU‘s climate change 
policy has not yet been addressed sufficiently in this literature this thesis can add 
new knowledge to the academic debate.  
Moreover, the study may also give some general indications about the current 
status and position of the various actors involved in the UNFCCC climate talks in 
general and about the prospective developments of EU policy-making in the area 
of climate change. The focus on leadership perceptions may also indicate to what 
extent an effective EU leadership may contribute to a progressive post-Kyoto 
agreement in the future. 
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 Gupta and Van der Grijp (2000) analyze the EU and others‘ perceptions in the area of climate change. 
However, their account does not apply a role theoretical approach and focuses on the pre-Kyoto negotiations. 
This thesis deals with the prospects of leadership for the EU-27 in the current post-Kyoto negotiations, which are 
arguably a much more complex setting. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
This paper intends to shed light on two basic and tightly inter-connected 
questions. 
 
1) How is the European Union‘s leading role constructed in the area of 
climate change,  
2) and does the European Union indeed play a leader-role in climate change 
politics? 
 
These questions will be tackled by a role theoretical account (see section 2.2) that 
is based on a qualitative analysis of interview-data and official documents. In 
order to fully assess the second question, we need to find out how the leader-role 
of the EU is constructed. 
For the first question, thus, I intend to find out about the leader-role that the 
EU holds of itself (ego part of the role) and how the Union constructs this role by 
scrutinizing its constituting elements. The self-perspective is then contrasted with 
the perceptions of ‗others‘ (alter part of the role) on the self-representation of the 
EU. This proceeding is a first step in order to answer the second question as a 
thorough assessment of the EU‘s leadership is only possible if we know about 
how the leader-role is constructed. 
The second question will be answered through an assessment of the leader 
performance of the EU together with a careful comparison between the ego and 
the alter part of the proposed role and its elements.  
Role performance is analyzed by applying leadership theory that provides for 
a distinction between three modes of leadership: structural, instrumental, and 
directional.  
Subsequently, the ego and alter parts are compared. As a ―leader is not only a 
party that fulfils theoretical criteria; a leader is one that is perceived as a leader‖ 
(Gupta & van der Grijp 2000:67), the EU needs to be recognized as a leader by 
others to qualify for the label as playing a leading role in CC. It can be 
hypothesized that if it turns out to be a predominantly conflicting relationship 
between the ego and alter role-part, the EU‘s ability to pursue its leadership role 
on climate change policies would be hampered. Thus, this could eventually mean 
that a leadership role for the EU may be very hard to perform. On the other hand, 
if the role ascribed to the EU by others predominately matches the conception of 
the EU‘s own role-conception, we could state that the Union has made 
considerable achievements as being a leader beyond mere rhetoric. Consequently, 
the EU‘s may then very well be described as being a leader in CC politics. 
  
1.3 Outline of the Study 
  4 
In the following chapter the theoretical basis of the approach applied in this study 
will be presented. In chapter 3 the methods for analyzing the leader-role 
construction are outlined, followed by a short overview of the climate negotiations 
in chapter 4. Chapter 5 examines the EU‘s self-perception of its role which is then 
contrasted with the perceptions of non-EU actors in chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 
concludes this thesis with a short summary of the most interesting findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  5 
2 Theory 
“There is nothing so practical as a good theory.” 
Kurt Lewin (1964:169) 
 
In the following I am going to present a role-theoretical framework that allows to 
structure the EU‘s leadership role in climate politics by taking into account the 
perceptions of the Union‘s self and views from third party actors. Firstly, I briefly 
expound the assumption of the EU being an actor in international relations. This is 
a necessary condition for further analysis. Secondly, I present a role-theoretical 
approach that facilitates the practical application to the case of the UNFCCC 
negotiations and climate policy in general. Thirdly, I elaborate on why and how to 
include perspectives from non-EU actors. Fourthly, I discuss the conception of 
leadership in international relations and introduce a useful leadership terminology 
that encompasses three distinct types of leadership. 
2.1 The Object of Study – The EU as an Actor 
The broad focus of this study is the EU in international politics. Thus, a 
precondition to discuss the EU in foreign relations is to come to terms with the 
question whether the Union is an actor in the international community.  
An actor in the international system according to conventional international 
relation terms is a sovereign state that pursues negotiations and signs treaties with 
other sovereign states. The EU is either depicted as an ‗almost-state‘ on the one 
extreme, or as a mere international organization on the other. This uncertainty 
about the international personality of the Union resulted in the conception of the 
EU as a sui generis geopolitical entity (Bretherton & Vogler 2006:15). Thus, the 
EU is not a state but it often pursues the mentioned state-like actions.  
Nevertheless, the Union is widely described as a pivotal player in international 
negotiations and seems to have a prominent position to influence global 
policymaking- especially in the area of trade and environment (Bretherton & 
Vogler 2006, Vogler 2005, Zito 2005, Rosencrance 1998). This lends evidence to 
the assumption that the Union can be considered an international actor (Bretherton 
& Vogler 2006). Hence, in this study the EU is considered an actor along with 
others in the UNFCCC talks where the Community also has legal personality as it 
has the ability to pursue negotiations and to interact with other players (Reischl 
2009:34).  
 
  6 
2.1.1 Mixed agreements and shared competence  
After it has been briefly established that the EU can indeed by conceptualized as 
an actor, the case of international climate negotiations (ICN) adds a complex layer 
to the picture. This is because the UNFCCC is a so-called ‗mixed agreement‘ 
under shared competence, where both the European Community (EC) and the 
member states are a party at the negotiation table
4
. The reason for this ‗mixture‘ is 
the fact that the UNFCCC negotiations touch upon competences of both the EC 
and the MS. According to article 300 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, issues that are covered by Community competences are to be 
negotiated by the Commission, whereas the member states formally negotiate 
those issues which fall under their competence. This procedure may undermine 
the ability to speak with a common voice and thus decrease the bargaining power 
of the Union (Frieden 2004).  
This is why in practice member states usually pool their voices in order to 
delegate negotiation authority to a common negotiator, which is most often the 
member state holding the Presidency (Delreux 2008). In the climate talks it is 
predominantly the Presidency that leads the Union as a whole and that pursues the 
climate agenda. This agenda is a commonly agreed mandate or guideline from the 
Council. This guideline is likely to be seen by third parties as representing the 
common position of the Union (Damro 2006:185). Furthermore, coordination 
meetings with national delegations and EC representatives as well as working and 
plenary group meetings are held to form an EU stance in the negotiations. This 
means that the EC and the member states (MS) rarely negotiate independent from 
each other (ibid.:178).  
The Commission‘s participation is crucial even if issues are not strictly within 
its competence as it is the only player that can assure an organized response to the 
complexities that emerge from the EU‘s obligations on climate change (Harris 
2007a).  
Because of the mentioned complexities of shared competence, the EU‘s 
climate negotiation system has been characterized as ponderous and requires 
immense efforts to achieve coordination. Thus, this constrains flexibility in the 
process of negotiation and it implies that the EU tends to be a predominantly 
reactive negotiator (Vogler & Bretherton 2006b:13). In general, problems for the 
performance of the EU‘s claimed leadership role, for example in form of 
misunderstandings or irritation from ‗outsiders‘, can be expected to arise from this 
set-up (Damro 2006).  
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 The basis for Community action in international (environmental) matters was laid by the European Court of 
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2.2 Role Theory 
Role theory is on the one hand related to constructivism in its presumption that 
decision-makers‘ perceptions about their environment might differ from its 
objective condition
5
. The presence and recognition of role concepts in the minds 
of policy-makers may affect and constrain their interests, as well as shape their 
policy choices (Orbie 2008). On the other hand, role theory deviates from 
constructivism due to its positivist underpinnings like the reliance on empirical 
observation, falsification, and hypothesis testing (Breuning 2008). Thus, this 
approach can be described as being based on ‗soft rationalism‘ or ‗thin 
constructivism‘. Material interests and objective reality do exist and play an 
important role, but intersubjective understandings matter as well (Vanden Brande 
2008b:2). 
Roles ―refer to patterns of expected or appropriate behavior‖ (Elgström & 
Smith 2006:5). March and Olsen‘s logic of appropriateness is of relevance here 
along with the idea of socialization. According to the logic of appropriateness, 
actors behave in the way they believe is expected from them in a specific context. 
Identities and roles, inter alia, shape behaviour (March and Olsen 1998:951-952). 
Hence, the behaviour or performance of the EU in CC negotiations can be 
fruitfully analyzed with the help of this approach. Socialization or social learning 
occurs in the interaction process with others (cf. 2.2.1). Exchanging information 
and communicating with others shape expectations of oneself and the other‘s 
behaviour. In other words, the roles an actor engages in are partly a consequence 
of ―learning and socialization in interactive negotiation processes where self 
conceptions are confronted with expectations‖ (Elgström & Smith 2006:5). Actors 
are however not entirely constrained by this process but have some freedom of 
what role to choose or how to play it in a certain context. There is, as Elgström 
and Smith (ibid.) put it, ―room for agency in role theory‖.  
Role-concepts are contextually determined and fluid across issue areas. For 
example, the EU may not have the same role(s) in the trade area as it has in 
climate policy (Elgström 2007b, Elgström 2006). Role-conceptions thus change to 
a certain extent along policy fields as they are ―connected to the behavior of an 
actor in a specified issue area or a certain organizational forum‖ (Elgström and 
Smith 2006:5). 
A role can be viewed as being constituted by certain elements, that is, 
recurrent perceptions or images, within a specific policy setting. The performance 
and construction of these role-elements then again shape and influence the 
overarching role conception of the Union and simultaneously other role-elements 
within the role matrix. This means that roles and role-elements are co-constitutive 
(see table 1). For example, a leader role is either constrained or supported by a 
recurrent image on the credibility of this role. 
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 Constructivists‘ point is usually that no objective truth exists and that all reality is (socially) constructed (Risse 
2004:160-61). 
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Table 1: Simple Matrix on Roles in International Relations  
 
In the present study, the leader role of the EU is the overarching role that is 
shaped as well as constrained or facilitated 
by role elements (or: sub-roles). These role 
elements are recurrent patterns of 
perceptions or images that can be derived 
from interview and textual data. In other 
words, the sub-roles are the constituents of 
the leader role. In the area of climate change, 
recurrent images of the EU have been 
inductively
6
 read out from the empirical 
material (cf. 3.6, 5.3). These elements 
encompass a view on the EU‘s leadership as 
(1) important, (2) multilateral, (3) coherent, 
(4) credible, and (5) responsible. They are 
occasionally overlapping and do not exclude 
each other.   
With the help of this specific role 
theoretical approach, I try to find out about 
the construction and external interpretation 
of the leadership role that the EU assumes. 
For example, if the role-elements mostly match or are to a large extent congruent 
with the leader conception, one can assume that the EU indeed plays a leader role 
in CC negotiations. If there are huge deviations to be found between the elements 
and roles, the leadership-role has to be ‗adjusted‘ or, inversely, the role 
constituents.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6
 Using an inductive approach means that data is collected and examined to derive hypotheses or a theory in 
order to explain the data found (Babbie et. al 2007:9). The resulting potential hypotheses are however likely to 
be a mere ―inference to the best possible explanation‖ (Hacking 2001: 16). 
 
 Impact 
Role 
Element 
c) 
Role 
Element 
b) 
Images and perceptions 
 Any description of ―objectives, 
choice among courses of action, or 
response to a situation in the envi-
ronment may be explained partly in 
terms of policy makers‘ perceptions 
of reality. People act and react ac-
cording to their images of the envi-
ronment. In policy making, the state 
of the environment does not matter 
so much as what government offi-
cials believe that state to be. By 
image, we mean individuals‘ per-
ceptions of an object, fact or condi-
tion; their evaluation of that object, 
fact, or condition (…) and the 
meaning ascribed to, or deduced 
from, that object, or condition‖ 
(Holsti 1992:291). 
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2.2.1 The ‗others‘ issue 
As already mentioned, most studies on the EU‘s international appearance do not 
focus on non-EU actors‘ views, but merely take into account what the EU‘s self 
displays. What makes role-theory fruitful is the emphasis on the dynamic 
interplay between the actor‘s self-conception and, on the one hand, actor 
independence and, on the other hand, structurally guided role expectations 
(Elgström & Smith 2006). 
Analyzing a role(-conception) takes into account a) the construction of the 
actor‘s self or self-image (ego part of a role concept) and b) the expectations and 
perceptions of others that interact with the actor in question (alter part). 
Consequently, a complex analysis of an actor, in our case the EU in climate 
policies, can be conducted. 
So what is the added value analyzing perceptions and expectations of the EU 
by third party actors? A mere look at what the EU internally displays or how it is 
‗domestically‘ constructed may not be sufficient to gain a complex image of what 
kind of an actor the European Union displays in the international (climate policy) 
arena. With the help of role-theory, the above mentioned two-sided approach (ego 
and alter part) can be conducted that takes into account the self-perception of the 
EU in climate policy matters, but broadens it with the view of how outsiders or 
‗others‘ perceive and assess the Union‘s role conception(s). This approach 
incorporates the assumption that ―others‘ views on the EU help to shape identity 
and roles‖ (Chaban et. al. 2006: 247). Thus, foreign policy roles are shaped 
through constant interactions between one party‘s role(s) and expectations from 
another party. This implies that with the means of analyzing third actors‘ 
perceptions of the EU, conclusions can be drawn about the very character of the 
EU, at least in a specific policy field. As a consequence it is possible to gain 
insights on whether the Union succeeds in externalizing its internal construction 
by comparing it to others perceptions and expectations
7. Outsiders‘ perceptions 
thus facilitate an analysis of what the EU is or seems to be in international 
relations in several ways. Firstly, in the most basic sense ―recognition by others 
allows for presence in global politics, which, not surprisingly is the sine qua non 
of global actorhood‖ (Jupille & Caporaso 1998:215). As this precondition - the 
EU being a recognized actor - is legally fulfilled by the EC being a full party to 
the UNFCCC (Art. 22, 23 UNFCCC), the second dimension of studying others 
perceptions is promising for the analysis:  
 
―(…) as the EU comes to interact with third states bilaterally, regionally, or globally, and as the 
number and frequency of these contacts increase, a process of socialization occurs according to 
which EU activity comes to be accepted and expected, and indeed according to which its very 
identity is formed and the identities of its interlocutors transformed‖ (Jupille & Caporaso 
1998:216).  
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 Of course, a completely congruent role-conception between EU and outsiders is impossible to obtain. Perfect 
communication and perfect understanding of others‘ and oneself would be a prerequisite for that. 
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Finally, other‘s assessments are a pre-condition for legitimacy in the international 
arena as legitimacy is a subjective quality (Elgström 2007a:952). 
2.3 Leadership – A Condensed Framework of 
Analysis 
This sub-section provides for the here proposed understandings of leadership and 
defines three different types of leadership that will be subsequently used in the 
analytical part. I will start to explain the significance of leadership in international 
relations by then proceeding with an attempt to define leadership in ICNs based 
on existing definitions. Deriving from this definition, structural, instrumental and 
directional leadership will be presented as the three applied leadership types. 
2.3.1 Leadership and its relevance 
There is relatively consistent agreement among academics that leadership in 
multilateral negotiations is of pivotal importance (Gupta & Ringius 2001, Jönsson 
2002, Sannerstedt 2005). Empirical studies of international negotiations evidently 
report of the significance of leadership in order to reach agreement (e.g. Zartman 
1994, Hampson & Hart 1999:339-40). Sannerstedt (2005:108) emphasizes that 
leaders are needed in order to avoid or circumvent deadlocks and to push the 
negotiation process to a solution. Moreover, the delegation of powers to leaders 
may be viewed as a functional answer by states to collective action problems in 
multilateral negotiations. Members of an international institution may for example 
delegate brokerage tasks, management of agendas, or mediation to more powerful 
countries (Nabers 2008).  
Generally, it has been theorized that the larger the negotiations and the more 
complex the negotiation set-up, that is, the more actors and negotiation issues 
which could be regarded as ‗national‘ interests by each country, the more it is 
likely that some actors will emerge as leaders and others as followers. As a result, 
with increasing complexity leadership becomes more crucial as a factor for 
successful negotiation (Underdal 1994:180-181).  
The UNFCCC climate talks are a potentially fertile field for the emanation of 
leadership due to the fact that almost every nation state participates in the 
negotiations and because of the vast number of issues that are linked to climate 
change (Kanie 2006). Therefore, leadership is a necessary feature in the climate 
change regime (Gupta & van der Grijp 2000:67). 
2.3.2 Cooking a definition of leadership 
  11 
The consensus on the significance of leadership in international relations has not 
entirely been transferred to the debate about what leadership actually is. There are 
several classical definitions of leadership in international relations theory which 
emphasize certain traits of leadership (Young 1991, Underdal 1994, Malnes 1995, 
Sjöstedt 1999 cf. Grubb & Gupta 2000, Andersen & Agrawala 2002, Skovdin & 
Andresen 2006). This results in a wide range of different leadership types. 
However, these concepts are rather a matter of labelling than of severe deviations 
in content. Drawing on existing leadership classifications, I will develop a 
definition of leadership that suits the analysis of the EU‘s leadership role in ICN. 
Consistent with the proposed framework of this study, this definition will depart 
―from a conception of leadership as a role that a particular country or organization 
can – or cannot – perform in a given negotiation‖ (Sjöstedt 1999:226-227, 
emphasis in original).  
I am going to take the risk of too many cooks spoiling the broth by focussing 
on a ―demanding definition of leadership‖ (Skovdin & Andersen 2006:14) 
developed by Arlid Underdal (1994), flavouring it with some critical insights from 
Nabers (2008) and spiced with the initially mentioned scholarly work of 
leadership. This is an attempt to develop a leadership typology that suits the 
analysis of the climate change regime, highlighting ―the fact that any typology of 
leadership needs to be adapted to the characteristics of the issue being negotiated‖ 
(Grubb & Gupta 2000:18). 
Underdal (1994:178, emphasis added) classifies leadership as ―an 
asymmetrical relationship of influence, where one actor guides or directs the 
behavior of others towards a certain goal over a certain period of time‖. He 
dissects this definition further into three qualifying constituents.  
Firstly, leadership in core is a ―relationship between [a] leader and followers‖ 
(ibid.:181). This relation is shaped by the responsiveness and the demand of the 
followers as well as by the supply of leadership services provided by the leader(s). 
Accordingly, ―leadership will clearly be most effective when supply matches 
demand‖ (ibid.). 
Drawing on the work of Burns (1979), Nabers (2008) stresses two important 
points which are not explicit in the proposed definition. Firstly, leadership is 
competitive. There is a constant struggle between actors that intend to lead: 
―Leadership is always contested by challenges from those who are left out of what 
we will call a ‗hegemonic project‘, and sometimes from those who find 
themselves in a subordinate position to the leader‖ (ibid.:9). Secondly, leadership 
is associated with influence and power (see also Underdal 1994, Skovdin & 
Andresen 2006). However, contrary to mere power holders, leaders are effective 
as they provoke change. Moreover, in contrast to pure power, leadership is 
indivisible from the wants and needs of the followers. These wants and needs, in 
turn, may be changed by means of social interaction (Nabers 2008:5-6). Also, it is 
worth mentioning that influence does not necessarily equal leadership (Sjöstedt 
1999:228). Influence exerted by a leader needs to have a major impact on the 
negotiation‘s main developments. That means that exerting influence over a minor 
technical detail cannot be called leadership (Kanie 2003). 
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Leadership and its relation to power and influence directs us to the second 
element of the above proposed definition. In order to qualify for a leadership role, 
it is necessary to be ―associated with the collective pursuit of some common good 
or joint purpose,‖ which implies that leaders are ―supposed to exercise what might 
be called positive influence‖ (Underdal 1994:178-179). Hence, the exercise of 
brute force is not a basis of leadership as a ―platform of shared values, interests 
and beliefs‖ is required for a leader role. It is however questionable what 
Underdal means with positive influence as he does not elaborate any further on 
this notion. In this study, it is therefore assumed that a purely self-interested actor 
is hardly compatible with a leader role. However, self-interest is still inherent in 
the leadership role. Or as Malnes (1995:94) coins it: ―[L]eaders normally take an 
interest in what they get out of various arrangements, but their activity qualifies as 
leadership only if self-interest takes second place to collective goals‖.8 Others, 
nevertheless, will not perceive a purely self-interested actor that intends to lead as 
a credible or legitimate leader, which ultimately undermines its leading role 
(Karlsson & Parker 2008:24).   
Finally, leadership has to be exerted over a certain period of time. A leader has 
to have more than just one commonly accepted, brilliant idea at a specific point of 
time (Underdal 1994:178). Kanie (2003:3) suggests that this time-span in the area 
of climate change politics ―may be translated into a series of regime building 
negotiation that would produce a main development such as UNFCCC or the 
Kyoto Protocol, lasting more than one [Conference of Parties] COP, at least‖. 
2.3.3 Modes of leadership 
In order to examine and evaluate the performance of a leadership role by the EU, 
we need to break down the aforementioned definition into modes of leading. 
Existing theory of multilateral leadership provides a fruitful account for this 
enterprise. There are different terms in describing ways of leadership (Young 
1991, Underdal 1994, Malnes 1995). Although these ways of leadership are not so 
different from each other (2.3.3), they lack a specific approach to climate talks. In 
this study, I will follow a typology provided by Grubb and Gupta (2000:18-23) 
who summarize the work of Young (1991), Underdal (1994), and Malnes (1995) 
and form a typology that is prolific for climate change negotiations. Accordingly, 
leadership is operationalized in three modes as structural, instrumental and 
directional leadership. As these modes are ideal-types, overlapping may well 
occur in reality (Kanie 2007:91-92). Moreover, these performances of leadership 
are not mutually exclusive.   
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 Arguably, this is not a clear-cut classification of self-interest and common interest. In actual negotiations a 
clear demarcation between self-interest and common interest is often infeasible to apply, as ‗purely‘ selfish or 
altruistic motivations often go hand-in-hand. For a critical account of collective versus self-interest within the 
leadership concept see Skovdin & Andresen (2006). 
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2.3.4 Structural leadership 
Structural leadership builds upon the structural capacity of an actor. It is 
―associated with the exercise of power derived from political strength in the 
global order and the weight of an actor with respect to the problem at hand‖ 
(Grupp & Gupta 2000:19). This type of a leadership role corresponds to coercive 
(Underdal 1994) or ‗sticks and carrots‘ (Malnes 1995) approaches to negotiations. 
Structural power stems from a state‘s material or political resources and is 
gainfully used to affect ―the incentives of others to accept one‘s own terms or at 
least make a concession‖ (Underdal 1994: 186). Hegemony is the ultimate 
extreme of structural leadership. However, absolute hegemony is irrelevant in the 
area of climate change because the issue‘s character is global and long-term in 
nature. No single state – or alliances or coalitions of states – would therefore be 
able to impose a long-lasting solution or bear the full expenses of climate change 
(Grubb & Gupta 2000:19). In other words, the sticks would not be long enough 
nor would the carrots be sufficient for a pure ‗sticks and carrots‘ approach.  
Structural leadership nevertheless remains significant as the ―structural 
element is indispensable in order to make others listen to one‘s voice‖ (Kanie 
2003:6) and hence correlates to the status of a party actor. In this context, a 
leadership role is likely to depend on how well and how sensitively structural 
power is applied to enhance the impact of other leadership modes. In the policy 
area of climate change, structural leadership relates to the size of present and 
potential future greenhouse gas emissions and the economic resources that a 
country is willing to bring to bear upon the global regime (Grubb & Gupta 
2000:19, Sjöstedt 1999:247).  
2.3.5 Instrumental leadership 
This mode of leadership is related to the exercise of political skill in negotiations 
and the creativeness of a leader to accommodate the needs of different parties 
regarding to the instrumental design of the climate regime. Moreover, it involves 
fostering beneficial coalitions in order to achieve common ends through the 
conveyance of instrumental negotiation tactics (e.g. issue-linkage and coalition 
formation) (Grubb & Gupta 2000:19, Underdal 1994). This leadership type is 
closely related to an ‗entrepreneurial‘ style of leadership which incorporates the 
skills of negotiators to detect and propose solutions to common problems (Young 
1991). 
The analysis of the EU to perform this way of leadership is constrained by the 
fact that instrumental leadership has its focus mostly on the individual level. An 
individual‘s personal leadership capabilities seem to determine success. While all 
leadership modes require individual skills for the transformation of leadership 
potential into concrete influence, structural (2.3.6) and directional leadership (see 
next section) are principally linked to states or other organizational entities 
(Skovdin & Andresen 2006:14-15).  
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The difficulty therefore is to ascribe instrumental leadership to the EU as a 
whole, and not just to single EU negotiators. However, it can be argued that such 
skilled negotiators leave a huge footprint on the perceptions of followers. As these 
negotiators are part of the EU entourage, others‘ perceptions may ‗spill over‘ to 
the assessment of the EU as an instrumental leader in general.  
2.3.6 Directional leadership 
This type of leadership emphasizes ‗leading by good example‘. The core of this 
leadership style consists of the combination of internal and external initiatives that 
aim at influencing the perceptions of others. Essentially, it means promoting a 
collective goal through influencing the behavior of other parties ―by moulding 
their interests, values and beliefs, rather than coercing or alluring them to do 
things they would rather not have done‖ (Malnes 1995:93). Grubb and Gupta 
(2000:21f) dissect this leadership manner in two inter-connected components.  
The first element stresses the development of perceptions and solutions, 
emphasizing leading by example primarily through the effect of domestic actions. 
The second component concerns the diffusion of these perceptions through active 
promotion of the leader‘s vision. Domestically developed solutions, accordingly, 
shall serve as a model that can be disseminated internationally. This type of 
leadership thus highlights the social interaction process by which perceptions 
about the self and others can be transformed (see 2.2; Nabers 2008).  
Generally, it has been hypothesized that the usage of directional leadership is 
most effective in international climate policy if it is conceived as a combination of 
structural and directional leadership (Oberthür 2007:78).  
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3 Methods – ―good research is 
research that works‖ 9 
The research methods I intend to apply originate largely in qualitative thinking. 
The here proposed framework is open to different sets of information as a 
supplement. The possibility to combine different methods, also referred to as 
triangulation or hybridization, is seen as a strength to put the study on an even 
more solid ground (Flick 2007, Yin 2003). The paradigm of this logic is that any 
kind of data about the same research problem reflects the ‗real‘ world, and can 
therefore be piled up in an additive way in order to add to the internal validity of a 
study‘s findings. 
This study takes a pragmatic stance and concurs with the words of Kvale& 
Brinkmann (2008:56): ―Today, the legitimacy question of whether a study is 
scientific, or whether it leads to true knowledge, tends to be replaced by the 
pragmatic question of whether it provides useful knowledge‖. 
The proceeding of this chapter is the following: First, I present the empirical 
data and the sampling strategy. Second, some limitations and possible criticisms 
are briefly discussed. 
3.1 Empirical Data – Expert Interviews and 
Qualitative Surveys  
Expert-interview data is the paramount set of empirical material for my study. The 
interviews conducted are mainly semi-structured in-depth face-to-face interviews 
with experts from both the EU and non-EU states and observers to the UNFCCC. 
Also, a qualitative questionnaire was used in eight cases10. Nine face-to-face 
interviews were conducted in Brussels and one in Copenhagen between 
November 2008 and February 2009 at the interviewees‘ workplaces. Together, 
both surveys and interviews form the empirical backbone of the study. The 
interviewees consisted of EU officials and non-EU diplomats (‗others‘). All 
interviewees work with climate, environmental or energy policy. For the most 
part, they participated in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) Convention on Parties (COP 14) in Poznan, Poland or had 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9
 Kvale and Brinkmann (2008:56). 
10
 For the sake of readability I refer to this whole set of data as interview-data in the following. The survey can 
be found at http://www.thesistools.com/?qid=74929&ln=eng. 
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expert knowledge about UNFCCC climate issues11. Complementary, two 
interviews were held with representatives of observers to the climate talks (United 
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the European Environment Agency 
(EEA), Copenhagen). The interview data of the EEA was used as mere 
background information and is not directly applied in this study, while the 
perspective from the UNEP has explicit influence on the study
12
.  
As indicated, all interviewed persons were considered experts. For the purpose 
of this paper, experts are people who have crucial knowledge of climate change 
issues within their respective governments and organizations. They have a 
prominent position – diplomatic personnel, high ranked civil servants, official 
government advisors – and represent a certain group, which in this case is a 
specific government or the EU (cf. Flick 2007). Apart from two interviewees, 
every person actively participated in the UNFCCC talks in Poznan and beyond 
that in earlier COPs.  
The choice of role theory as a framework attaches great importance on 
perceptions and expectations. Thus, research methods are required which are 
sensitive to and able to measure actor-perceptions. Expert interviews fit perfectly 
with the here proposed theoretical approach. They are a sound choice for finding 
out about role-concepts as these are expected to be illuminated in policy makers‘ 
statements and behaviour (Chaban et. al. 2006:248, Kirste & Maull 1996, Holsti 
1970:245, Harnisch 2000:3). Interviews under promise of confidentiality are a 
―reasonably reliable way to reveal how state representatives (...) experience other 
actors, although the risk of receiving ‗adapted‘ descriptions of state characteristics 
is still there‖ (Elgström 2007b:447). 
In order to facilitate a comparison of perspectives, interviews were semi-
structured. The advantage of this proceeding is that an interview-guideline allows 
for posing the same questions to each interviewee while at the same time provides 
for freedom to go into more depth or detail. Also, the option to ask follow-up 
questions and to ‗dig deeper‘ while not losing focus of the guideline are 
enormously helpful (Flick 2007:194-196). 
The type of survey that was used for my analysis is predominantly qualitative. 
Most of the questions were openly formulated13. To answer this type of question, 
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 For more details on the interviewees see the section on sampling (3.2.1 and 3.2.2). 
12
 The UNEP interview is considered as a perspective in between EU and non-EU actor, since the UNEP has 
observer status and enjoys, in a simple sense, a sort of referee position in the UNFCCC (see section 3.2.2). The 
perspective from the EEA is to evaluate the environmental performance of the EU and even European non-
members. In this sense, the EEA provides scientific information that can be used by European negotiators. Put 
simply, its role is ‗biased‘ and can be assigned to the perspective of the EU. For this reason this interview data is 
not applied in the study at hand.   
13
 O‘Brian (1997) gives a concise description of the qualitative nature of those types of questions: ―Open format 
questions are those that ask for unprompted opinions. In other words, there are no predetermined set of 
responses, and the participant is free to answer however he chooses. Open format questions are good for 
soliciting subjective data or when the range of responses is not tightly defined. An obvious advantage is that the 
variety of responses should be wider and more truly reflect the opinions of the respondents. This increases the 
likelihood of you receiving unexpected and insightful suggestions, for it is impossible to predict the full range of 
opinion‖ 
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as much space as the interviewee wished to fill was provided. The nature of the 
survey made that the questions were treated qualitatively. That means that the 
items were not operationalized in a quantitative manner but could be compared to 
the interview data. The respondents had several days to answer the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was provided electronically in form of e-mail and on a web-
server. Any attempt to gain a response to the survey involved an initial personal 
contact in order to assure that the right person answered the questions.  
I am aware that this approach could be dismissed as a chimera of qualitative 
logic in quantitative form. According to Beckett and Clegg (2007, see also 
Esaiasson et. al. 2007:259, Kitto & Barnett 2007) it is however possible to gather 
in ‗thick‘ data in this form of mostly open-ended question surveys as the 
respondent describes with his or her own words how a phenomenon is perceived. 
In general, capturing perceptions of negotiators by means of a survey is a feasible 
and fruitful way as recent studies have demonstrated (Elgström & Jönsson 2000, 
Sannerstedt 2005, Zutter & Toro 2008). 
3.2 Empirical Data – Official documents 
In order to get a more valid and reliable grip on the EU‘s construction in CC 
politics, expert-interviews are triangulated with official textual data. EU 
documents, strategy papers, communications and the like are dissected as they are 
likely to display the European Union‘s own ‗image‘ in environmental and climate 
policy. This follows the assumption that ―roles leave their mark in decision maker 
[sic!] speeches and statements‖ (Breuning 2008). Documents issued by EU 
institutions thus give us a consolidated picture of the EU‘s own role-perception. 
This two-fold approach, on the one hand analyzing interview data from EU 
officials, and on the other hand analyzing official documents, has several 
advantages. Firstly, it enables to investigate if a certain role or image that is 
anchored in documents has been ‗incorporated‘ by EU officials or vice versa. This 
would thus lead to a higher validity of the findings as both documents and 
interview data either affirm or negate a role-conception14. Secondly, it allows for 
mapping a process or development of the leader role and its sub-roles. 
Accordingly, it is the document that lays down a role, but the ‗living object‘ 
writes that document and is living and ‗beholding‘ this role. Both document and 
interviewee shape the role. As roles are process-related, changes in roles or 
developments are likely to be found in ‗living‘ role beholders (cf. Aggestam 
2006:13). Hence, there is a process-related interaction between role-related 
documents and persons.  
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 Documents from any EU organ are assumed to mirror a commonly agreed ‗official‘ EU stance peppered with 
compromises. Generally, they incorporate the EU‘s policy on CC. Thus, put simply, all the obstacles of the EU‘s 
logic of consensus and compromise might restrain the roles that are actually held by EU representatives at 
UNFCCC negotiations. 
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The basis of others‘ perceptions is principally interview-data, as ‗official‘ 
information about the EU‘s climate policy role from an ‗outsider‘ perspective is 
rather scarce and hard to get hold on. Moreover, limitations in time and language 
capabilities restricted the consultation of third countries official text-data. In an 
attempt to outweigh this slight imbalance, information from newspapers or 
websites has been occasionally incorporated in the study. 
3.3 Sampling  
Generally, the sampling mode of this study is strategic, as significant 
representatives of third party-actors, the EU and observers to the UNFCC 
concerned with global climate policy have been selected (cf. Flick 2007:165-170). 
3.3.1 Third state representatives 
The choice of interviewees was based on a set of principles. Firstly, the aim was 
to obtain a relatively broad picture of the perceptions of outsiders. Thus, more 
than just one single outsider‘s view should be taken into account. In other words, 
the principle of ‗the more the greater knowledge‘ has been applied in order to 
reach this goal. Secondly, this goal of ‗broadness‘ is certainly hampered as the 
COP14 negotiations under the UNFCCC hosted 191 official parties, including two 
observer states, and 464 observer organizations such as NGOs, IGOs and business 
organizations. It would be simply infeasible to conduct interviews with each third-
country representative involved. Thus, the number of interviews needed to be 
limited. The study therefore implies certain limitations of the empirical material 
that has been used. 
 The choice of interviews and texts was based on the assumption that a broad 
and nuanced picture could be drawn by taking into account respondents from both 
(1) developing and developed countries as they are the main ‗opponents‘ in the 
current post-Kyoto negotiations (cf. Section 4); Countries that are (2) 
geographically close to the EU as they are assumed to be more receptive to EU‘s 
leadership due to the Union‘s magnetic force (Rosencrance 1998); and (3) major 
countries
15
 have been picked as they can make a ‗difference‘ in the climate talks 
and have the potential to pursue a leading role on their own. This 
conceptualization emphasizes the competitive relationship inherent in the concept 
of leadership (cf. 2.3.2). Finally (4) specific countries have been selected 
depending on their membership of party groupings within the UNFCCC. The 
reasoning behind this was based on an assumption that certain groupings have a 
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 Major country refers to political, economic and ecological (in terms of high GHG emissions) weight. The 
assumption is that states like the US, Japan or China have a potentially big impact on the international arena and 
have the capabilities to (co-)shape the international climate regime (Harris 2007c).  
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common stance on the Union‘s leadership. Table 2 lists the countries selected and 
their group-membership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Non-EU „others‟ and membership in groupings 
 
The study thus builds on 11 interviews and survey results from third countries. 
This is not a representative sample in the strict sense, but due to the proposed 
sampling strategies, and an inductive logic, it could be argued that a limited extent 
of generalisation is possible at least by analogy or theoretical proposition (Yin 
2003:10-12).  
3.3.2 EU representatives 
The choice of interviewees from the EU followed a logic of variety. In order to 
obtain a thorough self-estimation of the Union‘s role, relevant stakeholders from 
the EU were asked for an interview. As the climate negotiations are under shared 
competence, a representative from the Council Secretariat had been interviewed 
along with civil servants from the Commission (DG Environment, DG Relex) all 
dealing with climate change matters and participating in the UNFCCC 
negotiations.  
3.3.3 The observer(s) 
IGOs enjoy observer status at the COPs. The UNEP is regarded as an impartial 
promoter of a post-Kyoto agreement having an unbiased view on the parties
16
. 
Valuable information about the EU‘s role from a comprehensive non-state 
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 To assume a totally impartial role for the UNEP would be naïve. For example, there might be sympathies 
depending on the financial contributions of certain states. Nevertheless, an IGO observer comes closest to 
impartiality. 
Interviewee/ Respondent Coalition/ Grouping 
Republic of Iceland  Umbrella 
Republic of Namibia G-77 and China 
Republic of Indonesia  G-77 and China 
United States of America Umbrella 
People‘s Republic of China G-77 and China 
Japan Umbrella 
Argentine Republic G-77 and China  
Dominican Republic AOSIS, G-77 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela OPEC, G-77 
Swiss Confederation Environmental Integrity 
Group 
Republic of Belarus n.a. 
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perspective probably contrasts non-EU states‘ perspectives and EU‘s self-image 
with a new and balanced picture.  
Although the role of observers in the negotiations is limited, their position in 
framing a role and communicating to the public and thus co-shaping a form of 
discourse should not be underestimated. It is therefore of relevance to take a 
closer look at those actors. 
3.4 Qualitative Text Analysis 
The method of analyzing the empirical data obtained is a qualitative or 
interpretative text analysis (Kvale& Brinkmann 2008, Esaiasson et. al. 2007). The 
interviews are analyzed by focusing on their meaning through language with the 
aim to verstehen (~critically understand) the underlying textual images. The 
leading question behind this is to find out about the potentially different 
understandings of the European leadership role.  
Moreover, this approach facilitates the detection and elaboration on the 
elements of the Union‘s leader-role. The interview and document data were 
dissected in order to elucidate the role constituents by means of theoretically 
informed reading of the material (Kvale & Brinkmann 2008:202). 
In order to do that, the study uses a set of analytical tools along what Kvale 
and Brinkmann (2008:233-234) call bricolage. It uses a ―multiplicity of ad-hoc 
methods and conceptual approaches‖ originated in interpretative textual analysis 
(ibid.). The variety of techniques enables a thorough understanding of the text 
analyzed. This approach is accompanied by codes and categories. Coding the 
interview-data and text-data is an essential tool to capture the entirety of the 
experiences and actions studied. The pre-determined theoretical categories are 
based on the proposed role-elements within the EU‘s leader-construction which 
are revealed by theoretical reading. They encompass importance, multilateralism, 
coherence, credibility and responsibility (cf. 5.3). Along these general codes the 
data has been categorized. This proceeding is considered fruitful since it leaves a 
certain leeway for surprising findings and structures the complex and extensive 
interview and text-data while at the same time allows for an investigation of 
differences or similarities in role-perceptions of the different interviewees. The 
main aim of the analysis is thus, by means of the interviewees‘ descriptions and 
the relevant text documents, to develop a critical and contextual interpretation of 
the EU‘s ‗climate role‘. 
To some degree the qualitative text analysis here is inspired by a dialectically 
inspired discourse analysis, where contradictions in texts are put forth (Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2008:226-228). This can be fruitful in order to see beyond the 
discourses of texts and to detect discursive images about the EU‘s leadership role 
(Jørgensen & Phillips 2002). However, this is not a fully fledged discourse 
analysis focussing on language and its impact on reality but more a way to find 
out about discussions and discourses within certain role-elements. 
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3.5 Critics and Limitations – A Fly in the Ointment? 
“Against criticism a man can neither protest nor defend himself; he must act in 
spite of it, and then it will gradually yield to him” 
 (Johan Wolfgang von Goethe) 
 
There are other ways of coming to terms with the EU‘s climate policy and 
international roles. This study, however, cannot take into account all approaches, 
ideas, and criticisms even though they might be sound for analyzing the topic 
concerned. There are limitations to this thesis that will be presented briefly. 
Firstly, the study‘s focus is on the European level, not explicitly including the 
member states‘ level. Taking into account all MS‘ domestic policies would be an 
infeasible enterprise. It is assumed that the MS commonly agree in different EU 
bodies, notably in the Council, on a policy and negotiation stance concerning 
global CC. By this means, the complicated and vast mosaic of European domestic 
policies can be circumvented. Nevertheless, it is favourable to have an eye at least 
on the larger MS policies as their positions can considerably influence the Council 
conclusions. Furthermore, foreign climate policy of the EU does not merely 
appear out of nowhere, but is a complex interaction of at least two levels (Putnam 
1988). This two-level game view informs this thesis to some extent. However, it is 
not explicitly applied due to time, resource, and space limitations. 
Secondly, the time focus lies on the recent developments in climate politics 
and the negotiations towards a post-Kyoto agreement as the interviews are 
concentrated on this period. Although crucial developments of the whole climate 
negotiation process are taken into consideration (cf. section 4), a thorough 
examination of almost 15 years of UN climate talks would be hard to conduct 
here. It is assumed that the period concerned is especially fruitful for analysis, as 
the EU‘s construction as a leader has matured over this time span - meaning that 
‗others‘ are able to evaluate the role over time -, and needs reinforcement for a 
post-2012 agreement. 
Thirdly, all concepts applied are certainly contestable. Leadership, for 
example, is difficult to disentangle from other negotiation behaviour (Andresen & 
Agrawala 2002:41) and role-theory is a ‗blind spot‘ in international relations 
theory that has been barely used in recent years. Nevertheless, the here provided 
framework is seen as stable enough to withstand disruptions from these criticisms.  
  22 
International efforts to politically tackle man-made global warming with its 
harmful effects of greenhouse gases (see Appendix) began at the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. As a result of 
this ‗Earth Summit‘ the UNFCCC was launched and came into force in 1994. The 
convention‘s objective is to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent hazardous, man-made interference with 
the climate system (cf. Art.2, UNFCCC). Explicit responsibility is laid on the 
developed countries (the so-called ‗Annex-1‘ countries) to provide resources to 
developing states in order to help them with their efforts to limit GHG emissions. 
The UNFCCC generated a series of UN climate negotiations - the COPs, which 
became the UNFCCC‘s overriding authority (Harris 2007a:10-11). Throughout, 
differences between developing and developed countries were a significant 
burden to the negotiations. Milestones of the following negotiations include the 
Berlin Mandate, the Kyoto Protocol, the Marrakesh Accords and the Bali 
Roadmap.  
At the first COP in Berlin in 1995, the Berlin Mandate established that Annex-
1 states would negotiate factual cuts in their GHG emissions, to be concluded in 
1997 at the third COP in Kyoto (Damro 2006:185). It was specified that Annex-1 
countries shall reduce their GHG emissions while at the same time assist 
developing countries, which were excluded from making cuts in their emissions.  
The negotiations resulting in the Kyoto Protocol have been ―especially 
contentious‖ (Harris 2007a:12) due to deviations between an EU proposal 
suggesting a target to reduce emissions by 15 percent below 1990 levels 
(Commission 1997) and a US plan aiming to reduce emissions to 1990 levels in 
2010 and further 5 percent by 2015. Generally, throughout the negotiations on the 
Protocol, the US position has been characterized as ―ranging from constructive 
abstention under Clinton to denunciation of the Kyoto Protocol and active 
obstruction under the Bush Jr. administration‖ (Bretherton & Vogler 2006:106).  
The resulting compromise required from Annex-1 countries to decrease 
emissions by 5.2 percent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. The EU 
agreed to collectively reduce emissions, which is also called the EU ‗bubble‘, by 
8 percent. The US agreed to a 7 percent cut. Developing countries were excluded 
from GHG reductions on the basis that they had not been responsible, as yet, for 
noteworthy GHG emissions (Damro 2006:187). Demands from the US to endorse  
 
4 The UN Climate Talks – A Brief 
Background 
The textbox below provides for a very brief background on international climate 
politics under the UNFCCC, focusing on some ‗climate talk essentials‘. This will 
facilitate the understanding of the analysis in the remainder of this study. 
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an emissions-trading program that allows developed states to purchase and 
sellemissions among themselves were incorporated in the Protocol, despite the 
then scepticism on the part of the EU. Further, so-called flexible mechanisms 
comprised in the Kyoto Protocol were Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). JI implies that developed countries can earn 
emission credits when investing in one another‘s emissions reduction ventures. 
CDM focuses on the possibilities for developed countries to invest in emission 
reduction projects in developing countries in order to gain emission credits.  
In October 2001 at COP-7, the Marrakesh Accords established the 
‗rulebook‘ for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and set up new funds 
to provide more aid for poor countries. Previously in March, the US announced 
that they would not ratify the Protocol and pulled out of the Kyoto process. It 
thus seemed as if ―the scene now appeared set for the EU to assume a leading 
role in the Kyoto process‖ (Damro 2006:187). Three years later, after 
considerable diplomatic efforts from the EU, Russia ratified the Protocol and it 
finally entered into force in February 2005. 
As the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012, the Bali Roadmap was established 
at COP-13 in 2007 as an outline on how to reach agreement on a successor of 
the Protocol. The Bali Road Map includes the Bali Action Plan, which outlines 
the course for a new negotiating process, with the aim of completing this at 
COP-15 in Copenhagen 2009 (Secretariat UNFCCC 2007). It includes 
agreement on four areas: mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer and 
provision of financing and investment. Crucial for the Bali summit was that 
developing countries opened up for discussion about own emission reductions. 
They accepted to contribute to measurable, verifiable and reportable reductions 
in GHG emissions supported with resources from developed countries.  
The recent COP (COP-14) in Poznan, Poland, has widely been 
characterized as having not delivered significant results. This was due to a late 
ratification of the EU‘s legal package on climate and energy and the restraint of 
the US delegation that was only willing and able to negotiate reduction targets 
under a new mandate from the newly elected Obama administration. At least, 
the negotiations resulted in establishing the formal conditions to agree on a 
post-2012 climate deal in Copenhagen (Secretariat UNFCCC 2008, 
Germanwatch 2009). 
In Copenhagen, negotiations about developing countries‘ commitments are 
likely to be a crucial issue as emissions from large developing countries like 
China (currently the largest total GHG emitter in the world being responsible 
for 24% of the global share of GHG emissions (NEEA 2008)), India and 
Indonesia will further increase. Industrialized countries along with the EU are 
therefore eager to get target commitments from the developing world. 
Developing countries on the other hand expect a greater share from the Annex-
1 countries and are reluctant to decide on binding emission targets. They insist 
on their right to raise their living standards, and point to their evidently lower 
GHG emissions per capita. Moreover, they emphasize the responsibility of the 
developed world for climate change since the industrialization and the growth 
of the West due to exploitation of resources from developing countries. 
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5 The EU as a Climate Leader 
This chapter tries to empirically shed light on the construction of the EU as a 
leader on CC negotiations. The self-image (ego) of the EU will be examined in 
order to find out if and how the Union conceptualizes a leading role for itself. This 
is the first step to evaluate whether the EU indeed can be theoretically and 
empirically described as a leader in CC matters. By taking a close look on the 
EU‘s self-representation, I intend to find out how the Union performs a potential 
leader role and how the leading role and its elements are constituted. In the next 
chapter, a second step is taken that takes into account the perceptions of others in 
order to generate a valid picture of whether the Union plays a leader role. The 
self-construction is then compared to the perceptions of ‗others‘ (alter) derived 
from the established qualitative data. 
5.1 The Leadership Representation and Performance 
of the EU 
―Since the early 1990s, the EU has increasingly established itself as an 
international leader (...) most prominent[ly] in the paradigmatic area of climate 
change‖ (Oberthür & Roche 2008:35). This and similar assessments (e.g. Vogler 
2005, Grubb & Gupta 2000, Harris 2007a, 2007c) reflect a consensus on EU 
leadership on CC among academics
17
. The occupation of the leader role by the EU 
has mainly been attributed to the abdication of US leadership in the beginning of 
the 1990s making it ―relatively easy to declare the EU the leader‖ (Harris 
2007c:365) on CC. Since then, the EU has worn the mantle of leadership 
enthusiastically (Bretherton & Vogler 2006:93).  
Indeed, since the 1990 Dublin Declaration the EU officially expressed its 
ambition to become a leading actor in international environmental politics already 
then seeing enormous ―capacity to provide leadership‖ (Council 1990, see 5.3). 
The ‗contemporary‘ Union is even convinced to have ―both the opportunity and 
the means to lead the global response that is needed to win [the] battle [against 
CC]‖ (Dimas 2007). It perceives itself ―in the international arena (…) at the very 
forefront of the fight against climate change and takes an active part in 
negotiations on the subject‖ (Commission 2008b). The EU ―leads the way‖ 
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 Of course, this does not imply that the academic community in unison hails EU leadership. Rather, the 
leadership is broadly acknowledged but also critically analyzed - especially the Union‘s domestic performance 
(e.g. Vanden Brande 2008a, Harris 2007, Karlsson & Parker 2008). 
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(Commission 2008a) to combat climate change and constantly reaffirms this 
leader role in its rhetoric. Furthermore, interviewed EU officials share and affirm 
this construction and unanimously view the Union as the clear ‗champion on CC‘. 
The position as a leader facilitates the Union to promote its role as it is 
economically, politically and even morally predestined to exercise global 
leadership on environmental matters (Council 1990).  
Hence, the style of EU leadership has been characterized as ―a ‗soft‘ 
leadership strategy‖ (Oberthür & Roche Kelly 2008:37) combining mainly 
structural and directional, but also instrumental, ways of leadership. While relying 
on its structural weight, the EU has applied soft power means, implying ‗setting 
an example for others‘, diplomacy, argumentation and the intention to change 
perceptions. This may be a matter of necessity and preference. On the one hand, 
the EU does not possess enough political and economic power to compel others to 
combat CC. On the other hand, ―this leadership approach correlates well with the 
notion of the EU as a civilian power in pursuit of a rule-based global governance 
in keeping with its normative preference for soft measures‖ (ibid.). In the 
following, I will take a closer look at the ways the Union pursues this strategy by 
applying three modes of leadership. 
5.1.1 Structural leadership – The EU punching its weight 
The European Union has been characterized to have a large ecological footprint 
by the scale of its industry, transport, agriculture and energy consumption being 
the world‘s largest economy. This makes it unavoidably one of the largest 
polluters and exploiters of resources on earth (Bretherton & Vogler 2006:89). 
Indeed, the enlarged EU causes about 14% of today‘s global GHG emissions 
(Commission 2005b). Also, today it represents 27 states, which makes it hard to 
be looked over given the sheer size of the population and the internal market. The 
interviewees
18
 are well aware of this structural influence and underline that the 
Union is a strong actor whose voice is ―definitely heard‖ in the negotiations. 
The EU is generally known for using its structural economic power within an 
environmental - respectively trade - context as examples from the WTO show, 
where the Union tries to implement ‗green policies‘ within the framework of the 
regime (Elgström 2006:23, 26; Bretherton & Vogler 2006:104-105). Despite 
resistance, the Union pushed for the incorporation of environmental standards and 
the recognition of sustainable development. This made commentators notice that 
even trade administrators try to ―consolidate the position of the EU as a green 
leader‖ (Vanden Brande 2008a:163). 
In the climate regime the economic clout of the Union facilitates the impact on 
others and may result in the changing of their preferences. The fact that the Union 
alongside its MS accounts for the most of the world‘s development assistance 
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 In this chapter interviewee refers to the interviewed EU officials. If a third state interviewee is meant, it will be 
indicated. 
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gives it a significant structural means to get other states to follow. Moreover, the 
EU is the gatekeeper to one of the world‘s biggest markets which is a strong 
power resource. By granting access to the internal market, the Union may impose 
environmental standards on trading partners. Eventually, this can lead to a ‗race to 
the top‘ when corresponding or even higher environmental measures are adopted 
in third country markets (ibid:162). 
The most impressive application of this mode of leadership was the active 
support for Russian membership to the WTO. This was a decisive ‗carrot‘ in order 
to persuade Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which eventually led to the 
coming into force of the Protocol. The use of the EU‘s ―benevolent‖ economic 
sway can thus serve as a crucial example for structural leadership (Damro 
2006:187-90). The clearest indication of this is a citation of former Russian 
president Putin saying that ―the European Union has done some rework during the 
WTO negotiations. Of course, this influences our positive stance toward the 
Kyoto process. We will advance the work to ratify the Kyoto Protocol‖ (in 
Karlsson & Parker 2008:27; my translation).  
What could diminish the future application of structural leadership are the 
decreasing GHG emissions within the 27 European states (EEA 2009). This seems 
somewhat paradoxical as a reduction of GHG is a crucial element for directional 
leadership (cf. 5.2.3) and indispensible to sustain international credibility. 
Moreover, the relative decline of EU‘s economic weight due to the increasing 
economic power of emerging countries is likely to hinder the utilization of 
structural leadership. 
5.1.2 Instrumental leadership – Skillfully forging majorities 
The EU‘s instrumental leadership by using political skill and crafting structures is 
a recurrent pattern in the ICN. The Union arguably puts hard effort into shaping 
important aspects of the climate regime by using instrumental tactics (Karlsson & 
Parker 2008:29-30, Schreurs & Tiberghien 2007:22).  
A source of its instrumental capability is the armada of skilled negotiators 
stemming from MS, the Commission and the Council secretariat. The EU can pick 
the most appropriate negotiators in different bargaining situations and is backed 
up with technical expertise, for example from the EEA (Interview Commission 
(COM), Zito 2005:368). This facilitates the avoidance of deadlocks at the 
negotiation table by providing innovative solutions. An example for this is the 
North-South debate coupled to the inclusion of developing countries (DC). As a 
post-Kyoto agreement needs to encompass less developed countries in an 
equitable and fair manner, the EU has made propositions to integrate the South. 
The design of adaption funds and agreements on bi- or multilateral partnership 
within and outside the regime framework is an illustration of the EU‘s 
instrumental leadership. Potential to form a ‗winning coalition‘ with DCs may be 
enhanced through the former colonial ties between many EU countries and the 
less developed world (Edwards 2002:12). As also earlier examples show, in 1995 
the Union succeeded in persuading the G-77 to agree to its proposal establishing a 
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negotiation process on legally binding emission targets for developed countries 
(Yamin 2000:50). Moreover, it eventually dropped a dogmatic position in the 
course of the Kyoto negotiations and has been striving for flexible solutions to 
problems rather than pushing a strict environmental agenda (Edwards 2002).  
As already mentioned, the Union‘s ability to have made important actors 
ratifying the Kyoto agreement is an example of the often necessary combination 
of leadership modes. The Union succeeded to foster a coalition with countries that 
were willing to agree to a binding commitment on GHG cuts, facilitated by issue-
linkage in the case of Russia (WTO-Kyoto). However, it is rather unlikely that the 
EU succeeded with this issue-linkage by solely relying on its political skills (cf. 
5.2.1). Thus, both the structural economic ‗carrot‘ behind the issue-linkage and 
the instrumental problem-solving approach of the Union made a ‗winning 
coalition‘ possible that served the interests of all parties. 
Constrains to the Union‘s performance as an instrumental leader comprise its 
difficulties to manoeuvre quickly internally due to institutional complexity and 
interest diversity (Zito 2005, Müller 2003:ii). 
5.1.3 Directional leadership – The Union paving the way 
Leading by the good example is probably the most frequent and important way of 
leadership displayed in the post-Kyoto climate policy of the EU (cf. Oberthür 
2007). Rhetoric by EU leaders constantly emphasizes the importance of setting an 
example for others to follow. For example, EU Commissioner for the 
Environment Stavros Dimas (cited in Schreurs & Tiberghien 2007:22) made clear 
that Europe‘s CC leadership 
 
―is not just leadership for the sake of leadership, or because we think we can fight climate change 
on our own—we clearly can‘t. The EU‘s commitment and success has been an inspiration to our 
global partners. Without it, it is certain that the Kyoto Protocol would not have entered into force.‖ 
 
The European Union‘s directional leadership thus explicitly intends to change 
others perceptions in order to get them to acknowledge the EU‘s leading role. As 
the citation shows there is a strong confidence about the Union‘s achievements 
within its role. Indeed, ‗inspiring‘ examples based on the decision to unilaterally 
go in front are numerous. The paramount case is the rescue of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Bretherton and Vogler 2006:105-09). The decision to move forward with 
ratification of the Protocol after President Bush Jr. on March 28, 2001 declared 
that the US is going to withdraw from the agreement still builds an important 
basis for the directional leadership of the Union. It set an example, which other 
actors, notably Japan and Russia, eventually followed.  
Already in 1996, the European Council declared in its conclusion that the 
global average temperature rise should not exceed 2° Celcius above pre-industrial 
levels on basis of recommendations from the IPCC. This measure is (still) the 
Union‘s benchmark to set its emission objectives in order to meet the mandate of 
the UNFCCC (Harris 2007c:366). Apart from the Alliance of the Small Islands 
  28 
States (AOSIS) that champions a 1.5°C limit due to their special vulnerability, the 
Union‘s goal is the most ambitious among the industrialized countries (Oberthür 
2007:78). Only recently the Union succeeded in diffusing its 2°C goal to all major 
economies whereof many states were formerly opposed to. At the Major 
Economies Forum 2009 in Italy, the most powerful heads of states recognized that 
global average temperatures ―ought not to exceed 2 degrees C‖ (MEF 2009). This 
example shows that the Union sets an example, which it then promotes 
internationally. 
With the coming into effect of the world‘s first carbon emission trading 
scheme in January 2005, which copied the successful US sulphur dioxide (SO
2
) 
emissions trading system established in 1990, the EU again set an example. It has 
even been suggested that the Union could become an international standard setter 
due to the ETS and might find ―itself in control of the most important 
international regulatory effort to limit GHGs‖ (Legge & Egenhofer in Vogler & 
Bretherton 2006:7). Indeed, the Union makes efforts to promote its scheme to 
other states (EP 2008).   
The most recent illustration of the Union‘s endeavour for directional 
leadership is the 2007 announcement to unilaterally reduce its GHG emission by 
20 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2020 (Council 2007a). This emphasizes 
the EU‘s seriousness to lead the post-Kyoto process and the commitment to push 
the global climate agenda forward while ―other countries have not even talked 
about what they are going to do‖ (Dimas cited in European Voice 2009b). The 
Union is furthermore willing to reduce its GHG by 30 percent given that other 
developed countries take action within the framework of an international 
agreement (Council 2007a). This implies that the Union seeks a directional 
strategy, which gives other industrialized nations an incentive to follow the 
Union‘s lead. It thereby prepares ground for others to join a post-2012 agreement. 
Although the Union goals have been criticized by environmentalists as not 
ambitious enough (Oxfam 2009, European Voice 2009b) the European approach 
has been hailed by Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of UNFCCC, as ―the most 
ambitious offer on the table so far to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2020‖ 
(Secretariat UNFCCC 2009). With the ratification of the Climate and Energy 
Package in December 2008, which included the 20/20/20 goals
19
, the Union has a 
‗domestic backbone‘. It now has to be proven whether the Union is able to 
implement and reach its aspiring goals. 
In general, a combination of the aforementioned leadership modes (5.2.1, 
5.2.2) is fruitful to get a more effective directional leadership: In order to function 
as a successful policy entrepreneur that is promoting ideas, the EU needs to be a 
credible example that is in the forefront of CC policy-making while giving its 
example a larger impact through its structural clout. 
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 The goal meant the domestic reduction of GHG emissions, the increase of energy efficiency and the 
enhancement of renewable energies by 20 percent. The goal for energy efficiency is however not binding. 
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5.2 The EU‘s role construction – Five Recurrent Role 
Elements 
Europe‘s intention to become an active and leading entity in environmental 
politics can be traced back to the early 1990ies
20
 with the 1990 Dublin 
Declaration of the then European Communities as its probably clearest 
expression. By and large, this declaration formed the essence of the self-image of 
the EU in international environmental matters until today:  
 
―There is (…) an increasing acceptance of a wider responsibility, as one of the foremost regional 
groupings in the world [1], to play a leading role in promoting concerted and effective action at 
global level [3], working with other industrialized countries, and assisting developing countries to 
overcome their special difficulties [2]. The Community‘s credibility and effectiveness at this wider 
level depends in large measure on the ability to adopt progressive environmental measures for 
implementation and enforcement by its Member States [4, 5]. The internal and external 
dimensions of Community environment policy are therefore inextricably linked‖ (...) 
 
―[EU‘s] capacity to provide leadership in [the] sphere [of global environmental polictics] is 
enormous. The Community must use more effectively its position of moral, economic and political 
authority to advance international efforts to solve global problems and to promote sustainable 
development and respect for the global commons [5]‖ (Council 1990) 
 
Based on five elements found in this declaration and – (1) global importance, 
commitment to (2) multilateralism, (3) coherence, (4) credibility and (5) 
responsibility – the ego-part of the Union‘s leader role is scrutinized. These 
elements are constituents of the leader role and shape the conceptualization of the 
Union‘s leadership. Importantly, these elements are not limited to the citation 
above but can be found as recurrent patterns throughout official EU 
documentation (e.g. Commission 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2008c) and in the 
interview data from EU officials.  
5.2.1 The element of importance – the big and rich counterweight  
The EU sees itself as an important player in global environmental affairs. It is a 
―foremost grouping‖ that has the capacity to be a significant factor in multilateral 
environmental agreements. This implies an underlying notion to challenge and 
lead other players with EU‘s weight and capacity (cf. structural leadership). Also, 
the close association with the concept of leadership which bears a meaning of 
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 The European Union‘s (or European Communities‘) attempts to influence global environmental politics can 
arguably be dated back to the 1970ies. The ambition to play a significant part in international environmental 
politics however started in the early 1990ies (Wurzel 2008, Vanden Brande 2008a, Vogler & Bretherton 2006). 
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―rule and dominance (…) and negotiation strength in multilateral environmental 
regimes‖ (Bretherton & Vogler 2006:103) is incorporated in this part of EU‘s ego.  
Hence, the Union‘s view on influence in CC politics comes into play. The 
interviewees view the Union as a rather powerful actor with obvious impact on 
the negotiations. The power sources lie in the credibility of its leading 
commitments to reduce GHG emissions (cf. 5.3.4) and its economic respectively 
financial strength. As the negotiations are ―basically about money, who‘s paying 
for climate change‖ (Interview Commission (COM)), the EU‘s ‗power of the 
purse‘ has an enormous leverage21. The EU is portrayed as the principal 
paymaster of the CC regime which gives it some sway over the setup of the 
regime. Also, developing countries (DC) are more likely to follow the Union‘s 
lead, when they are provided with financial incentives. 
Another indicator that the European Union constructs itself as globally 
important and influential are references to the character CC policy being 
interconnected with security, trade and energy policy, giving it the label of ‗high 
politics‘. The interviews state that the EU is now more present in the area of ‗high 
politics‘ due to its climate leadership. As climate policy started as a soft ending up 
as a hard issue, the EU is able to show its citizen and third states that it is able to 
‗deliver‘ (COM). Or as one interviewee put it: ―the fact that the EU can handle 
such a hard subject reinforces the EU‖ (ibid.). 
Seen from a broader perspective, if an actor portrays itself as globally 
important, it justifies a position from which it may impose its views on others 
(Chasek 2007:364-65, cf. Holsti 1992:340-344). In the context of the (post-)Kyoto 
negotiations, this may also imply counterbalancing the US, the Union‘s foremost 
other (cf. Fioramonti & Lucarelli 2008, Diez 2005, Bretherton & Vogler 2006:43, 
56-57, Yamin 2000:62).  
The long-lasting conflict on CC between the US-government and the EU has 
been a major sticking point in EU–US relations during the ‗Bush years‘. There has 
been a constant negotiation battle between the US and the EU on several issues 
since the run-up to Kyoto, leading a commentator to state that ―seldom in history 
has the EU criticized the US as forcefully as it has over this issue‖ (Schreurs in 
Harris 2007c:365).  
This conflict is still mirrored in the current transatlantic relationship. Since its 
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001, ―the US basically was coming to 
negotiations just to stall and to block‖ (Interview Council (COUN)) and was the 
perceived ‗bully‘ of CC matters. US domestic records on tackling CC have been 
described as  poor apart from state-level actions (Paterson 2009), but only 
recently, newly elected President Obama changed track and now constitutes the 
US as a global leader on CC (Obama 2008a, 2008b, 2009). The basis for that 
leadership is the pledge to return to 1990 GHG emission levels by 2020 through 
the ‗Waxman-Markey bill‘ and the commitment to foster a post-Kyoto agreement 
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 ―[S]aying that we have an impact on the solution in terms of financial commitment, exemplary attitude, even 
technology transfers is obvious. It‘s very clear. Does that make us more powerful? I say so. I truly believe so‖ 
(COM).  
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despite domestic resistance in the Senate and Congress (Paterson 2009). The US 
claim for leadership could thus be perceived as challenging the ego of the EU. 
The Union still sees itself as the ambitious leader that shows the US – and others – 
way. Yet, its efforts are not acknowledged as, in ironical reference to the US, ―it‘s 
actually the ‗mean‘ guy on the other side who‘s getting all the benefits‖ (COM). 
Indeed, media and even environmental campaigners have warmly welcomed the 
new approach of the Obama administration. 
Interviewees from the Commission and the Council confirm a potential 
transatlantic rivalry for CC leadership. There seems to be a competitive 
relationship between the US and the EU on climate politics leadership, with the 
EU presenting a more striving position (Reuters 2009a, Dimas 2009). The EU 
welcomes the new approach of the US but at the same urges the United States to 
be more ambitious and therewith reinforces who the ‗real‘ leader on CC actually 
is (Reuters 2009b). The German minister for environment Sigmar Gabriel coined 
this ‗superiority‘ on CC leadership felicitously: ―measured by what Europeans 
believe needs to be done to fight climate change, we're [the EU and the US] still 
are very far apart from each other‖ (Reuters 2009c). Also, what might still play a 
part is the infamous ‗inferiority complex‘ of the EU towards the US. A desire of 
Europe‘s politicians is to show ―that the EU could ‗stand up to the US‘, act 
without American support and demonstrate that it [is] a force to be reckoned with 
on the international stage‖ (Edwards 2002:32). Indeed, there are signals from the 
interviewees that back up this assumption (COM).  
In turn, there are signals from the US that European leadership on CC is soon 
to be seriously challenged. Former US vice president and Nobel-prized climate 
ambassador Al Gore strongly doubts the European ability to exercise climate 
leadership and is quoted to state ―I think the United States is the only nation that 
can lead the world‖ (Euobserver 2009a) particularly concerning CC. He urges the 
US to take on bold action on CC "in order to repower our economy, restore 
American economic and moral leadership in the world and regain control of our 
destiny‖ (AFP 2009). Thus, it seems as if there is a discourse on competition for 
leadership emerging. Indeed, this is mirrored in observations of Paterson (2009) 
who predicts a ‗hegemonic struggle‘ for leadership on CC. Accordingly, the post-
Bush era is likely to be characterized by continuing EU-US conflict over CC. This 
may appear to be surprising as the US made major moves towards developing a 
more active CC policy under Obama. But as the citation of Gore indicates this 
competition has serious political-economic implications with two competing 
capitalist approaches on the two sides of the Atlantic
22
. On the level of leadership 
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 Paterson (2009) sees a conflict between the European ‗ecological modernization‘ versus the US-embraced 
‗carboniferous capitalism‘ with CC as a key terrain of competition. The former model promotes ―a set of 
aggressive constraints on carbon emissions while promoting alternative energy resources and significant 
increases in energy conservation and efficiency‖ (ibid.: 148). The latter endorses subsidizing new forms of 
energy to supplement old energy sources, while the element of binding constraints on carbon use is almost 
absent. This model of growth is based on ―the availability of cheap inputs for all industries as a means to out-
compete other economies‖ (ibid.:149). Generally, Paterson identifies climate policy as a potential source of 
competitive gains with examples ranging from the estimated 64 billion US $ carbon market industry to border 
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in the climate regime, the US meets with the EU an established leader on the 
climate negotiation process. There is thus already an ample impetus behind a 
regime and its structure ―which the US no longer feels it owns‖ (ibid.:145). The 
EU is already familiar with its leadership role and is far less likely to comply with 
US demands compared to the negotiations that led to the Kyoto Protocol. Signs of 
an interest in bashing Kyoto in the US consequently emerged in the American 
discourse on CC (ibid.). Hence, some commentators have started to talk of the 
regime as ‗Eurocentric‘. This is despite the fact that the basic institutional features 
exist at the persistence of the US (Vogler & Bretherton 2006). According to this 
logic, the US will keep on trying to apply pressure on the climate regime to 
change its overall architecture, ―precisely because it is one which is now 
associated with European leadership, and one which EU countries have built an 
economic strategy around‖ (Paterson 2009:145)23. Indeed, economic arguments 
circle around the EU leadership discourse to be found in official documentation 
(e.g. Commission 2009a, 2009c) and interview data. Accordingly, leading by 
example would give the EU a ―first mover advantage‖ mirrored in the set-up of 
the European emission trading scheme (Commission 2009b).  
Additionally, there is still the American perception that it can act unilaterally - 
on CC as well as on other issues. It does not need to consider multilateral 
developments that have occurred in its absence and its preferred approach, which 
has been decided domestically, can be imposed externally (Chasek 2007). 
However, while the US may be able to enforce its interests in relation to other 
regimes, in relation to climate change, the US ability ―is far from clear‖ (Paterson 
2009:145).  
In stark contrast to these arguments, there is also a strong sense of partnership 
between the EU and the US. As indicated above, this is coupled to the 
inauguration of the Obama administration that ―amounted nothing less than a sea-
change in the US position‖ (Commission 2009c) and a general commitment to 
multiparty partnerships. On the other side of the Atlantic, US President Obama 
facilitates US-EU partnerships with his rhetorical shift towards a general 
commitment to more multilateral approaches (Obama 2008b). The EU in turn 
emphasizes an increasing convergence of EU and US positions on CC issues 
(Commission 2009c). Moreover, the EU acknowledges that in the CC 
negotiations, it is ―not the only show in town‖ (COM) and it therewith tries not to 
overstate its position. Indeed, the structural power of the US, its large amount of 
GHG and its diplomatic sway are all reasons why a regime with the United States 
is more likely to be successful than without it. The EU sees itself as being able to 
seize a role as a bridge builder between DCs and the US while at the same time it 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
tax adjustment aimed at preventing carbon leakage. This makes ―Kyoto-like actions precisely designed as 
competitiveness strategies‖ from the EU point of view (ibid.). 
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 The US debate on the ‗architecture‘ of climate governance illustrates the abovementioned claim. US 
commentators make the presumption that‖ Kyoto has ‗failed‘ (in part because the US has not joined) and thus a 
new architecture (implicitly, more conducive to US interests) is required‖ (Paterson 2009:152) 
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tries to push the US to an ambitious agreement within a coalition
24
. Apart from 
being large emitters and sharing the label of developed countries, a range of 
common interests such as energy security from oil and economical prospects of 
‗green technology‘ facilitate cooperation (Paterson 2009:153).  
Thus, this part of the ego displays an ambiguous self-confidence of the EU. 
On the one hand, it mirrors the Union‘s power, coined by one interviewee: ―We 
are a strong actor and now that the US is onboard, I think we would be an 
important bridge builder‖ (COM). On the other hand, as the citation explicitly 
states, a role as a bridge builder is also a possibility for the EU in the post-Kyoto 
process, indicating a sharing of leadership together with the US (COUN). Joining 
forces to fight CC would thus not mean abandoning the leadership role, but it 
would secure influence on the transatlantic partner within a strong coalition 
(ibid.). A scenario of shared leadership is also a signal of the re-gained importance 
of the US in climate matters and the EU‘s sense for multilateralism. At the same 
time it reinforces the image of EU‘s global importance: being a leader together 
with the world‘s current superpower. 
5.2.2 The multilateral element – joining the Union to fight CC 
The EU does not intend to lead without other states‘ support as it tries to convince 
other actors multilaterally. It is ―at the forefront of driving forward a multilateral 
process within the UN system‖ (Paterson 2009:141). Indeed, the Union does not 
strive for pure dominance as it incorporates the conviction that ―multilateralism 
doesn't work if you have one single leader crushing the other‖ (COM). The EU is 
―smart enough not to pretend we're the only one, because if we wanted to be the 
only one it would be stupid, we would lose it all‖ (ibid.). This is fairly in line with 
the proposed definition of leadership as it shows mutuality, which is a condition 
for being a leader. In general, commitments to multilateralism can be read from 
the Union‘s rhetoric, as it intends work together with other countries to promote 
its stance on CC and environmental policy (cf. e.g. Council 2007a, Commission 
2009b). On the practical level, the EU incorporates many of the suggestions from 
the IPCC. It works on CC issues through bi- and multilateral forums like regional 
EU-Asian partnerships (Vanden Brande 2008a:169) and through other UN fora 
(Damro 2006). The nature of the CC problem contributes to the EU‘s stance to 
―believe deeply in multilateralism (..) and if [CC] is not a common problem then I 
don't know what a common problem is‖ (COM). 
On the other hand, there is a perception that ―until now, there has been no 
other leader in the past five years. There has been no other leader on climate 
[policy]‖ (COUN) implying that the EU is the leader in CC politics. This tends 
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 ―I hope that there's a kind of coalition between the both [the EU and US] to make sure that [the US] are as 
ambitious as possible. And by that, engaging also others like China and India. That's the basic thing. If the EU 
and US are ambitious enough, there‘s no reason for China, India and others to stay on the sidelines‖ (COUN; cf. 
Niblett 2008). 
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towards the aforementioned global importance factor and seems to be at unease 
with multilateralism. However, unilateral action is perceived as a mosaic in an 
overall multilateral approach to CC. It is seen as showing the way for others to 
follow (cf. directional leadership; COUN, COM). Scholars have generally coined 
this commitment to multilateralism in the area of CC as ‗logical‘ given EU‘s 
integrative nature and the cross-border character of the challenges arising from 
climate change (Damro 2006:176). Another commentator (Niblett 2008:126) 
confirms this by adding that  
 
―[i]f one overarching theme dominates European thinking about international order in the twenty-
first century, it is the extent of the interdependence between the lives and destinies of nations and 
people around the world. The policy area that manifests this interdependence most clearly is the 
need to confront climate change‖  
 
Thus, the commitment to multilateralism is deeply anchored in European values, 
which facilitates a leader role as a ‗good‘ and instrumental leader that listens to 
other parties needs and builds winning coalitions.  
5.2.3 The element of coherence – a single voice? 
The ego-side of the leader role incorporates the assessment that ―externally we 
always manage to keep a kind of a strong and rather unified perception‖ (COUN), 
through speaking, negotiating and acting as a unified actor (Karlsson & Parker 
2008:26). There is nevertheless an awareness of potential rifts in this presentation. 
A pertinacious struggle for more effectiveness and concerted action is displayed 
in the Union‘s presentation. The call for more coherence in foreign policy is 
namely a recurrent element in the Union‘s representation: EU foreign policy 
action ―that matches [its] potential‖ has to be ―more coherent‖ (European Security 
Strategy 2003:11). In CC affairs, the EU calls upon itself to ―organise itself so as 
to present a single EU position and policy and a convincing and consistent 
approach over the years that this effort will require, so that the EU pulls its full 
weight‖ (Commission 2007). Coherence is thus a precondition for effective 
leadership (cf. Gupta & Grubb 2000, Cramér et. al. 2008:10-11). The nature of 
CC negotiations being subject to mixed agreements results in the many EU actors 
being involved in the process. There is a constant struggle for competences 
between the MS and the Commission as well as discussions within the Council 
and the Commission about appropriate actions in the area of CC. It has been held 
that the ―constant quarrelling over competence (...) is giving the EU a bad 
reputation‖ (Vanden Brande 2008a:165) reflecting a view of the Union as being 
more concerned with internal discussions than with substantial negotiations on 
CC. Interviewees acknowledge ―on the negative side, the fact that the EU can‘t 
move so easily‖ and that it has ―very rigid positions‖ (COUN). This is due to the 
complex decision-making process in the context of shared competences along 
with the intra-sectoral character of CC where final international positions have 
been negotiated internally as a rather fragile product of consensus (cf. Bretherton 
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& Vogler 2006:90-99). Despite the general EU negotiating position agreed by the 
Council, the Union often needs to alter its position during negotiations. However, 
there is no overarching authority that may take binding decisions on behalf of the 
European Union. The Commission or the Presidency thus cannot take binding 
decisions without consulting the MS to agree on a consensus (Vanden Brande 
2008a:166). Lacaste et. al. (2007:214) point out that the process of finding a 
consensus among MS and the Community can be cumbersome and even delay 
action. This can hence result in a serious hurdle for the EU‘s capacity to 
demonstrate leadership in the negotiations (cf. Elgström 2007a, 2007b). 
Shaping an internal consensus on climate policy has become even more 
difficult since the accessions of the new MS (COM; COUN). This is due to the 
dependence on coal in many of the new MS and their lower GDP per capita which 
makes actions against CC a more difficult enterprise for the EU
25
. The 
interviewed EU officials indicate that, in general, the new rules of the Reform 
Treaty would improve this problem and facilitate a better co-ordination.  
In line with the ‗bad reputation‘ argument, interviewed EU officials 
unanimously perceive certain reluctant MS to ‗dilute‘ the image of the EU as a 
progressive climate leader (ibid.). Evidence for this impression can be found, for 
example, in the reluctant position of Poland and Ireland in the question of the 
Climate and Energy Package (Euractiv 2009, PBS 2008) or there are even 
conflicts within different DGs of the Commission on sustainable development 
(European Voice 2009a). The interviews elucidate certain inter-bureaucratic 
wrangling (cf. Bretherton & Vogler 2006:91). For example, the Commission‘s 
DG Environment, which ―has been opposed by all [other] departments 
historically‖ and ―culturally used to handle [CC] on their own‖ (COM) is thus 
cautious to share its information with other DGs involved in climate issues, which 
contributes to a certain amount of internal inconsistency. As the EU‘s CC policy 
is subject to complex decision-making procedures and touches practically upon 
the whole scope of the Community‘s policy competences, it can be of significance 
for the Union‘s construction and performance as a leader against climate change 
and ―not least [(...) be] a source of bewilderment for third parties‖ (Bretherton & 
Vogler 2006:91).  
Despite the diverse agendas of the different EU bodies, a homogenous 
discourse of the EU as being a consistent climate leader has emerged since the 
early 1990ies. All EU bodies involved in CC shape an image of cohesive EU 
leadership (Schreurs & Tiberghien 2007). As the main bodies, the Council 
(2007a), the Commission (2005, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c) and the European 
parliament uphold and promote the image of ―the leading role of the European 
Union in international fora‖ (European Parliament (EP) 2009). Furthermore, the 
consultative bodies, the European Social and Economic Committee (2008) and the 
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  One interviewee coined it nicely: ―I have to admit that with the accession of the new MS, it  has complicated 
the matter. Because there are some specificities of the new MS. There are some MS that are heavily dependent 
on coal. For example Poland. Poland is depended on almost 100% on coal for its electricity needs. So that 
doesn't make things easy. The other thing is that they have a low GDP per capita. That means they cannot be 
expected to do as much as the old MS. Except, of course, if they get the money to do it‖ (COUN) 
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Committee of the Regions (2007), which represent European civil society and 
regions, share this image. As to the international negotiations and the need for the 
EU to present itself as a unitary or coherent actor, the Union has made 
considerable steps forward (Bretherton & Vogler 2006:99). It became a leading 
actor ―despite the special difficulties associated with mixed competence‖ 
(ibid.:89) in the area of CC. An interview-source (COUN) expressed that ―things 
have changed substantially, six- seven years ago the Union was more busy with 
trying to reach a position [internally] than with speaking to others, now the 
internal meetings are quite focussed and quite brief and we reach [a] common 
position quite fast‖. The internal co-ordination meetings during the COPs have 
developed to be ―very informal and very effective‖26 (COM). Despite the 
mentioned set-backs, the EU ―works wonderfully well‖ compared to other 
negotiating blocks, like ―the G-77, which are constantly split‖ and ―have even 
bigger differences within their group than the EU‖ (COUN). The image of the EU 
admits that its position in international negotiations is rather immobile due to the 
complicated internal decision-making process of the EU. Its position nonetheless 
becomes increasingly flexible
27
. Moreover, the wide range of subjects and policy 
areas that have to be covered by an EU CC approach is not necessarily seen as an 
obstacle. The overarching CC problematic in the development area is for example 
viewed as ―mutually self-supporting‖ (Commission 2009c). The EU sources 
(COM, COUN) point to the possibilities of extending the scope of its leadership 
role to other policy domains, especially to development policy where the Union 
with its MS already has a strong standing as being the world‘s largest 
development aid donator (see below). Accordingly, Europe is ―not transferring, 
[but] joining two areas of leadership‖ (COM), coupling CC and development 
policy. In conclusion, despite some difficulties with the coordination of internal 
and external positions, the ego of the Union can be described as fairly consistent 
due to a European consensus on EU leadership on international CC matters. This 
unity ―will be of central importance for the EU to be able to exert directional 
leadership‖ (Oberthür & Roche Kelly 2008:37). 
5.2.4 The credibility element – the EU practicing what it preaches 
Fourthly and unsurprisingly, the EU perceives itself as being a credible and 
rightful leader. As expressed by Commissioner for the Environment Stavros 
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 On the implications of informality in environmental decision-making see Vanden Brande (2008a:166-167). 
27
 The interviewee from the Council gave an illustrative example of the ‗new‘ flexibility of the EU in CC 
negotiations: ―During the Poznan conference there was the question about the operationalization of the 
adaptation fund. And there, developing countries were asking for not only access to that fund via implementing 
entities or executing entities, but also directly by governments. There was a fear by developed countries, also 
from the EU, that there would be some problems with countries, having not such a good governance system in 
managing those funds. They [i.e. the governments] have direct access without the control from others. But in the 
end the EU accepted this. This would never be possible five years ago.‖ This flexibility increases the closer ―the 
date to achieve an agreement in Copenhagen‖ comes (COM). 
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Dimas, in the eyes of the EU, ―everyone accepts that Europe is leading the fight 
against climate change‖ (European Voice 2009b). The basis for this self-image is 
that the EU‘s credibility as an international environmental actor is coupled to the 
performance of a leader role. There is awareness that ―the Community‘s 
credibility and effectiveness at this wider level depends in large measure on the 
ability to adopt progressive environmental measures‖ (Council 1990). In order to 
be a credible leader, the inter-linkage between external and internal CC policy is 
significant (ibid.) as effective domestic action diffuses leadership to third 
countries (cf. directional leadership). It is therefore important to make a ‗good 
impression‘ to shape others‘ views as ―expectations are important, and behaviour 
judged to be incongruent or cynical can result in a loss of credibility‖ (Bretherton 
& Vogler 2006:40). In other words, successful domestic action may increase the 
Union‘s international credibility. An example for consciousness of this is the 
Parliament‘s call for ―urgent need for the EU and its Member States to meet the 
targets of the Kyoto Protocol in order to play [a] leading role in a credible way‖ 
(EP 2009). Hence, credibility has a key foundation in the accomplishment of 
domestic EU actions in order to make others believe in the leadership of the EU. 
The interviews show that there is confidence in the domestic accomplishments 
which facilitate international trust in the Union‘s leader role: ―it will be no 
problem [for others] to accept the EU leadership and the EU example on 
environmental policy because we have a quite good track record‖ (COUN). The 
EU is portrayed as being ―the people who can deliver‖ (COM). When it says or 
announces something, it keeps its promise.  
Closely associated with this finding is the construction of a self-conception as 
an honest player that plays with open cards
28
. The European Union practices what 
it preaches and does this in a transparent manner. The strategies and actions that 
the EU decides on fulfil one of the tasks of directional leadership, namely raising 
the Union‘s credibility. A foundation of this honesty lies in the stiff institutional 
set-up of the EU. If the Council releases its conclusions, which form the basis of 
the Union‘s negotiation mandate, EU negotiators have to stick to what the Council 
decided. Since Council conclusions, documents and communications from the 
Commission are available on-line, third parties know immediately and detailed 
about the European negotiation position (COUN, Interview Japan (Japan)
29
). 
From this point of view, the complicated decision-making process within the EU 
furnishes it with useful by-products for climate negotiations: honesty and 
transparency. So, somewhat paradoxically, the stiffness of the negotiating position 
can be framed as giving the Union a higher credibility
30
. According to the EU 
interviewees, EU negotiators occasionally use this as a negotiation strategy. 
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 ―Other parties know about the position of the EU. Clearly. That cannot be said from others, who try to hide 
behind some issue. So, honesty. That‘s the (…) thing‖ (COUN) 
29
 In the following, the names of the countries in brackets indicate an interview-source. For example, 
(Switzerland) means that the reference or source for a sentence is the interviewee from Switzerland.  
30
 What may complicate matters is the apparently growing flexibility of the EU‘s negotiating position (cf. 
footnote 27). This may increase the possibilities for coherence. But thought strictly further within the above 
mentioned argument, this flexibility may undermine the Union‘s credibility as well. 
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Still, as practical climate actions are predominantly under the competence of 
the MS, interviewees notice that there is a potential for a loss of credibility due to 
MS that lag behind in their climate efforts. What weakens this possibility is that 
the GHG cuts of the EU are negotiated under a ‗bubble‘, which takes into account 
the totality of EU‘s cuts. Nevertheless, the increasing emissions of some MS, 
notably Spain, Greece and Portugal, together with the considerable variation of 
efforts against CC depending on MS could undermine the leading position of the 
EU (cf. Karlsson & Parker 2008). 
The emphasis on credibility originates also in a response to the European 
publics‘ interest in CC (Vanden Brande 2008a, 2008b). This is clearly reflected in 
the statements from the EU interviewees. The Union can play a credible role as a 
leader, as it can be sure of the support for its CC leadership among its citizen. 
Indeed, there are consistent numbers of Europeans that want the EU to lead on 
climate change (Eurobarometer 67) and the EU responds to this expectation by 
appointing CC as a EU priority in the 2010 Annual Policy Strategy (Commission 
2009d). On the international level, the Union in turn sends signals to the European 
people through the fulfilment of a leading role. This is perceived as ―a way to 
prove to our citizens: look, we can deliver!‖ (COM).  
5.2.5 The responsibility element – the good guy 
Fifthly, the EU sees itself as a moral actor in environmental affairs. It perceives 
itself as ―the good guy‖ and ―the responsible guy‖ (COM) at the negotiations. 
Generally, the Union‘s ethos is one of a ―special responsibility for the 
environment, both to [its] own citizens and to the wider world‖ (Council 1990). 
This contains an underlying notion of the Union being a ‗force for the good‘ (Diez 
& Pace 2008). The Union thus has the moral obligation respectively a ―wider 
responsibility‖ to act as a leader in international environmental politics on behalf 
of the world and its citizens. The relationship to DCs which is characterized by 
overcoming ―their special difficulties‖ is an important mosaic in this picture. The 
Union sees itself as the principal developed partner for developing economies in 
the CC issue (Council 2007b). It is portrayed as ―Africa‘s best friend in the 
negotiations‖ (COM) as it acknowledges that ―[c]limate change is hitting poor 
developing countries hardest as they are most vulnerable and have the least 
economic means to respond to the negative impacts‖ (Commission 2005a:14). 
Also, the EU does not demand binding targets from least developed countries 
(LDCs) (Commission 2006, Dimas 2007). The reward that the EU gets back from 
its responsible role is that less developed countries are more likely to agree on the 
Union‘s CC policy. In turn, this means that the overarching leader role of Europe 
is accepted frictionless. Consequently, there is a prevailing perception that the 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the LDCs are strong supporters of the 
EU‘s leading role due to the ambitions of the EU and its financial means (COM). 
The climate negotiations are tightly coupled to development politics and are 
fundamentally about global inequality (Roberts & Parks 2006, cf. section 4). The 
UNFCCC (Article 3(1)) enshrines the principle of ‗common but differentiated 
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responsibility‘, which gives developed countries the liability/responsibility? for 
historical emissions. At the same time, they are less vulnerable to CC impacts and 
are able to pay for actions to cut GHG. DCs emerge stronger economically, which 
leads to them being big emitters. China, for example, is today the world‘s largest 
emitter of GHG. However, the main priority for less developed countries is 
economic growth and poverty reduction, which made them state that any future 
agreement on international climate protection that is not based on fairness and 
equity is not going to be signed (Roberts & Parks 2006). As the developed part of 
the world demands GHG cuts from DCs in a post-Kyoto agreement, normative-
ethical considerations like responsibility and fairness ―– notions not commonly 
perceived as essential to serious international discourse (or of most foreign policy 
practices and analyses)- are absolutely central to efforts to address global climate 
change.‖ (Harris 2007c:353). Since the EU takes into account the principles of 
equity and common but differentiated responsibilities (Commission 1999:19) and 
―arguably acts much more ethically than do its developed-country counterparts‖ 
(Harris 2007c:370), it has the ―moral upper hand‖ (Elliot 2004:88) towards 
reluctant developed countries, notably the US. Since other actors are more 
reluctant to apply this ‗mentality‘ of fairness to their CC policies, this makes it a 
seemingly special feature of the EU (Harris 2007c:350, Mayer 2008). 
International environmental equity, justice and fairness thus leave a considerable 
imprint on the construction of the EU‘s ego. Following this argument, 
international environmental equity has been deeply incorporated in the European 
self-image and shapes its foreign policies on global CC. 
The analysis of EU documents and action largely affirms this assessment. The 
Union‘s fight against CC ―forms an integral part‖ of its foreign policy agenda 
which emphasizes assistance of DCs to fight poverty, the achievement of the UN 
Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development 
(Commission 2006). Thus, the EU‘s approach ―to promote adaptation to and 
mitigation of climate change is to ‗mainstream‘ these objectives into strategies for 
poverty reduction and/or sustainable development‖ (ibid.). On the action level, the 
Commission (2003) developed a strategy to support developing countries with 
mitigation efforts and works through several bilateral and multilateral fora on 
CDM initiatives and climate change mitigation
31
. In its climate protection 
program it explicitly acknowledges that equity is ―fundamental to the climate 
challenge‖ (cited in Harris 2007c:353). The Union seems to be committed to its 
moral obligations and has recently made suggestions on the financing of adaption 
funds. It sees itself as an instrumental leader in the development of the CDM 
mechanisms and financial aspects of a post-2012 agreement, urging other 
developed countries to follow its track (Reuters 2009b, Commission 2009a). 
Developed countries have the financial and technological resources and stay for 
the clear majority of GHG emissions. Therefore, the EU tries to push other 
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 These co-operations include, inter alia, the EU-India Clean Development and Climate Change Initiative, the 
EU-China Partnership on Climate Change, the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument and a Global Climate 
Change Alliance which includes LDCs and the SIDS. 
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Annex-1 and OECD member countries through its leader role to pay their ‗fair‘ 
share. What comes into play here is a confession to play a role as the ―rich guy 
who wants to be liked by the people‖ (COM). According to this logic, helping 
DCs with financial means thus facilitates leadership as they are more likely to 
follow. 
There is also an element of guilt and expiation which is reflected in the 
statements of the EU interviewees. The historical and present emissions make the 
EU ―one of the origins of the problem‖ (ibid.) and the colonialist past of many of 
the EU MS makes CC cooperation occasionally difficult: 
 
―Look, we've been the baddies for so many centuries. We've been the colonial power; we've been 
the one exploiting the South. Remember the 1950's? The horrible Franco, German or English 
colonial powers, we brought pain to the world, we've done the all the bad things, you can imagine. 
We are the good guys now. (...) We can do a lot there, and now we are the good guys and 
obviously we are the ones who originated all this climate change.‖ (COM) 
 
There is also a consciousness about the flaws of EU‘s stance on developing states 
and its moral role. One interviewee (COM) pointed out that the Union is not doing 
enough to secure the DCs support. Furthermore, a perception that DCs are getting 
annoyed by the European ‗wiseacre‘ attitude that patronizes these states can be 
derived from the empirical data.  
Though dulled through the ‗moral EU‘ image, there is an increasing 
perception that takes into account a concern about the potential costs and 
competitiveness implications of climate policy for the European economy. The 
EU‘s directional leadership implies that the EU has ―abandoned its previous 
stipulation that all industrialized countries must be engaged in making emission 
reductions and ensured that, in the first phase at least, the costs of the climate 
regime will be mainly borne by its Member States‖ (Bretherton & Vogler 
2006:106). This fades back to what has been stated on the political-economic 
features of climate change (5.3.1) and may contradict the responsible directional 
leadership to a certain degree. Notwithstanding this obstacle, the EU has been 
characterized as to have raised the moral standard against which other have been 
judged (Gupta& Ringius 2001:289).  
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6 The Other Side of the Coin – EU 
Leadership Perceived by Outsiders 
It has been established so far that the EU sees itself as fulfilling a role as a leader 
on CC. In the eyes of the EU, the performance of this role rests upon a ‗soft‘ 
leadership strategy that mostly combines structural and directional modes of 
leadership. The self-perception is based on five elements or images of the leader 
role. However, the self-construction as a leader is merely a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to qualify for a leader-role in CC politics. In order to be a 
‗genuine‘ leader, others need to perceive the Union as such one (Gupta & van der 
Grijp 2000:67). In order to assess whether the EU indeed can be seen as a leader 
and how the Union‘s role is mutually constructed, I will compare the ego with the 
Union‘s alter part of the role conception.  
6.1 The EU – A Leader in the Eyes of Others? 
Unanimous agreement among third state representatives clearly shows that the 
Union leads on CC, no matter whether the interviewees represent a developing 
country, developed country or might have ideological constraints towards the 
Union
32
. Noteworthy in this context is that even the ‗heavyweights‘ on the 
international scene the US, Japan, and China affirm the Union‘s leader role. This 
allows for conclusions to be drawn on the definite international weight of the EU 
in CC politics (cf. 6.2.1). In general, the alter-construction matches with the 
general self-construction of the European Union as performing a role as green 
leader. Observers underline that ―[the EU] has been on the forefront for many 
years. It's been the strongest advocate of action‖ (Interview UNEP (UNEP)) and 
has been showing ―a number one leadership compared to other countries‖ (Japan). 
What adds to this evaluation is that EU leadership has been assessed as consistent 
and continuous
33
 (all interviewees; cf. Gupta & Van der Grijp 2000).  
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 Among the third countries that comprise my empirical material are states that have different (ideological) 
perceptions from the EU about e.g. democracy, human rights or free markets.  
33
 This is a major achievement as leaders usually ―come and go. It's not a static situation. It used to be that the 
AOSIS group was very, very well prepared. In the sense that they were well supported by a number of NGOs 
and were extremely punching above their weight. That‘s diminished in the recent years‖ (UNEP). The Union 
seems to defy this mechanism as it ―has shown leadership for many years‖ (US). 
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There is a confirmation of the ‗soft‘ leadership strategy that incorporates all 
three types of leadership (5.2). The Union is seen as using its structural weight in 
form of its economic clout to back its instrumental and directional leadership. 
However, the two pictures (alter and ego) do not match so perfectly, when we 
analyze the role-constituents in more detail. 
6.1.1 Structural leadership 
There is unobstructed agreement among the third country officials that the EU can 
lead via its structural weight. The European economic weight and financial power 
can persuade other, mostly DCs, to follow the Union. Yet, mere financial means 
are not sufficient to make DCs to followers (Indonesia) as ―there is not enough 
money to buy Chinese or Indian agreement‖ (UNEP). The financial power of the 
EU ―can help but it cannot dominate‖ (ibid.). This may also be part of the 
explanation of why the Union needs to exercise a combination of the three modes 
of leadership. Apart from economic influence, scientific power is mentioned as a 
structural means of the EU. However, the economic clout is the by far most 
dominate instrument of the EU‘s structural leadership. Except for one developed 
country (Iceland), the Union is said to have used its economic power occasionally. 
Others, in general, are well aware of the Union‘s gatekeeper function to its 
internal market (China). Hence, the ―Union matters because of its large economy‖ 
(US). The structural capabilities are thus always in the back of outsiders‘ minds 
when they negotiate with the Union (cf. Oberthür 2007:78). 
6.1.2 Instrumental leadership 
The perception of instrumental leadership is based on the evaluation of the 
negotiation style of the EU as being always prepared and having a thorough 
knowledge of technical details. It is voiced that the EU often negotiates with a 
wide focus on the future backed up by scientific evidence and support of civil 
society. Opinions of the EU on proposals by third states are important as they can 
make ―proposals or viewpoint[s] more feasible‖ (China). The Union is 
characterized as a ―very strong diplomatic power because they already have 
problem strategies and they prepare well for the negotiations‖ (Japan). Also the 
sheer number of EU negotiators including the MS diplomats is seen as an 
advantage for exercising leadership. Negotiators from the EU are praised as 
having ―a lot of skill and also technical expertise. They can provide us with all the 
information about the environment‖ (Indonesia). Moreover, some interviewees 
reckon that the experience of EU negotiators within the EU gives them generally 
an advantage in multilateral negotiations. The formulation and planning of 
policies by the EU is described as ―very well‖ (China). However, some DCs note 
that the EU largely abandoned its instrumental leadership in the recent COP in 
Poznan. They expect more progress on the issue of funding and technology 
transfers as outlined in the Bali Action Plan (ibid., UNEP). 
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6.1.3 Directional leadership and some constraints 
The Union is generally seen as to be able to play a role as directional leader by 
setting (domestic) examples, and by that, inspiring others. The EU ―does do its 
homework well‖ domestically and ―in the past five to ten years, it has come 
forward with ideas and with a clear position‖ (UNEP). Its role is ―dominant‖ in 
the discussions and by and large the Union ―know[s] the direction‖ (ibid.) This 
indicates that the EU may well be able to mould others‘ perceptions through its 
discursive impact on the discussions and by that might get ‗power over opinon‘ 
(Manners 2002:238-9). Some DCs point out that Europe ―can play an active role 
and can show the good example. Especially concerning the issue of (...) 
cooperation between the developing and [the] developed world‖ (Indonesia, cf. 
6.2.5). The domestic measures of the EU are evaluated as pivotal for its leading 
role in CC. Thus, it is ―the great work done in national policies [that] strengthened 
the EU´s role‖ (Argentina). Especially ―to the other developed countries, the EU 
shows ambitious targets and demonstrated with concrete measures how to achieve 
a target‖ (Japan). Not only domestic decisions, but also the EU and its 
commitment to CC as a whole serve as ―an example for other developed countries 
to deal with climate change‖ (China). This emphasizes the ‗soft‘ approach of the 
EU, and might correspond to Manners (2002:252) well-known statement ―that the 
most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does 
or what it says, but what it is‖. The Union‘s rhetoric is echoed by some 
interviewees, both from developing and developed countries, stating that ―the EU 
plays a key role in the making and implementation of climate change policy‖ 
(Iceland, cf. Indonesia, China). Again, this affirms the Union‘s domestic 
capabilities. As ―the EU, and its MS have among them a good experience in 
taking measures‖ (UNEP) all third countries perceive that they can learn from this 
experience either ―to a large‖ or ―to some extent‖. Thus, third party actors ―may 
learn from EU‘s practice‖ (US). As a concrete example for this, the European 
ETS was named frequently. This means that EU domestic policies clearly have an 
‗emanation‘ on others. Indeed, all experts asked state that the policies at EU-level 
have an outreach or impact on the world.  
There is also a perception that the EU pursues a ‗green mission‘ within its 
leadership realm. Except for one third country (Venezuela) all experts confirm 
this impression. Its mission is to preach about the benefits of ‗green growth‘ 
(Switzerland) backed by a consistent rhetoric about sustainable development 
(Baker 2006, Vanden Brande 2008) and by a Swedish EU Presidency that made 
CC a priority during its presidential period (Namibia). Closely associated to this 
perception is a reading of the Union as teaching others about CC by the good 
example. Accordingly, others gain knowledge of Europe: ―we learn from their 
policy and action and programs on how they make their people more 
understandable‖ (Indonesia). This perception is not only limited to DCs but 
prevails also in developed countries officials‘ minds. Thus, the EU may, at least to 
some extent, be a ‗teacher‘, model or ‗missionary‘ for others to follow in CC 
matters. This seems to be consistent with the Union‘s self-image.    
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However, despite this rather good evaluation, the potential to inspire and set 
standards for others to follow is ambiguous and somewhat limited. Whereas the 
smaller countries with the exception of an African and a Latin American country 
(Namibia, Venezuela) state that Europe‘s CC policy inspires their own approach 
to fight global warming, the global powers US, Japan and China are reluctant to 
ascribe the Union such a merit
34
. The reasons for this might lie in their own 
structural capacities along with a tendency to strive for hegemony, or ‗doing it 
alone‘ that is assigned to global powers (Chasek 2007:364-65). Nevertheless, 
examples that major powers are ―very interested in the result of the [Climate and 
Energy] Package‖ (Japan) may signal that domestic action by the EU is of 
importance for their approach. Especially European ―non-EU members do look to 
the EU in regard to different issues and view their position with interest‖ 
(Respondent Iceland) which may reflect the regional importance of the Union or 
its ‗magnetic force‘ (cf. Power). The case why Venezuela and Namibia do not 
gain inspiration from EU policies may lie in their experience of how the Union 
treats them. 
Another adjustment to the leader perception is that others do not clearly 
perceive the Union to be the only leader in CC politics. Apart from a clear 
minority (Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Switzerland and Belarus) it is not 
entirely seen as an ‗undisputed‘ or single leader.  International and regional 
powers (USA, China, Argentina, Japan), DCs (Namibia, Indonesia) and observers 
(UNEP) perceive other states as either potentially or equally being able to lead. 
For the most part the US, followed by China, India and Brazil were named as 
other leading countries. This could indicate potential problems for the leadership 
role of the EU, as it may result in a competition for leadership. Nevertheless, it is 
consistent with the self-construction of the EU, which incorporates the need to 
mutually come to a post-Kyoto agreement by emphasizing multilateralism and a 
(although ambiguous) will to share leadership (cf. 5.3.2, 5.3.1).  
When asked about the performance of the leadership role of the EU, the 
picture of this role further gains some slight cracks. Apart from the already 
mentioned disappearance during COP14, there are voices that want more 
commitments from the EU to ―help developing countries with adaptation 
strategies‖ (Respondent Dominican Republic), for example ―regarding financial 
options or new mechanisms‖ and ―by putting numbers on the table‖ (Respondent 
Argentina, cf. Venezuela). Nevertheless, there is an overwhelming majority of 
respondents and interviewees that perceive the performance of the leadership role 
as rather or very good. Except for the African and the Venezuelan respondent 
which see the EU performance as neither good nor bad, there seems to prevail 
consensus that Europe acts well in its leader role. 
6.2 The Elements of the Alter Part 
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 The US diplomat made clear that the EU ―certainly‖ can set standards, but ―not everybody follows‖.  
  45 
In the following, we will take a closer look at the constituent elements of the 
Union‘s ego and try to contrast them with the perceptions of outsiders. This 
proceeding makes it possible to outline the complex relation between the ego and 
the alter part of the role.  
6.2.1 The element of importance – A strong competitor?  
The European self-conception to be a significant player in the CC regime is 
broadly shared by the alter-construction. The EU is ―critical‖ and a ―particularly 
relevant player‖ (UNEP) in the negotiations. The EU ―matters‖ in many ways and 
has the ability to exercise power in form of economical and scientific incentives. 
On the question how others perceive the ‗general impact‘ of the EU in 
international climate policy, only two respondents state the Union‘s influence to 
be ―modest‖ (Venezuela, Argentina), while all other respondents find the EU to 
have a ―huge impact‖. This is often associated with the character of the Union as a 
‗negotiation block‘ that consists of 27 MS, which ultimately gives stronger 
influence as its positions have been well negotiated internally (Japan). Other 
countries, although they usually are member of a negotiating group, lack this 
influence. The Icelandic respondent notices that negotiating on ‗its own‘ ―does 
indeed put a tag on the role of Iceland in the negotations as compared to the EU 
which speaks for 27 countries and therefore has a stronger voice and presence in 
the negotating room‖35. 
While Japan generally ascribes the EU ―strong power‖ the US specifies the 
Union‘s power as ‗soft‘ and ―appreciates the important role it plays‖ in CC 
matters. This, again, indicates the specific approach of the Union in combining 
leadership modes in its ‗soft‘ manner (Oberthür & Roche Kelly 2008:37). 
Intersecting with the findings about the EU‘s structural and directional capacity, 
the ―EU can exercise power by science [and] economics‖ (China) and gets its 
voice heard in the international arena through its directional leadership capacities: 
it ―make[s] the main stream in the climate change negotiation[s]‖ (ibid.) and thus 
seems to be able to change others‘ perceptions.  
There is also a perception mirrored in the answers of third party actors that 
corresponds to the notion of the EU as a ‗counterweight‘ to the US. For example, 
an interviewee remarked that the European Union ―used to be an alternative to the 
US for Latin America‖ (Argentina). Before the changed US administration there 
was an almost hostile atmosphere between the two transatlantic partners which the 
US official ironically compares to as being in Iraq during the war. To date, this 
relationship has seemingly changed considerably towards a more positive attitude 
to each other. However, several third states indicate that there could be an 
emerging competition for leadership due to the new policy on CC of the Obama 
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 Iceland is member of the Umbrella group and does not per se negotiate on its own. The respondent remarks 
however that ―[b]y this I do not mean that the views of countries that are only speaking for themselves are not as 
important as the bigger groups; but the  situation is different for them‖. 
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administration: ―when Mr Obama became president, the competition began‖ 
(China).  
On the side of the Americans this has been recognized as the US interviewee 
asked ―why is Europe so anxious of the US to play a leading role?‖. The 
relationship tending towards competition is thus the result of role competition. 
However, this competition is blurry and ambiguous. On the one side the US tries 
to regain a leadership role, with a president that is ―truly committed to climate 
change‖ (US), and a perception by other parties that ―if [the] USA change its 
climate change policy, EU leadership will encounter competition‖ (China). The 
rise of the US in CC is just a question of time and soon ―we will see the US come 
back in a very dominant way‖ (UNEP). The US is frequently portrayed as a very 
important player in the global climate regime with immense structural capacity. 
This perception seems to have remained throughout a decade (cf. Gupta & Van 
der Grijp 2000:69). An indicator for this perception is that a part of the third state 
diplomats state that the COP14 meeting in Poznan was stalled due to the waiting 
of the new administration under Obama (Japan, Indonesia). Without the US, no 
post-Kyoto deal seems feasible. Also, the hype about a ‗new green deal‘ both in 
the US and Europe couples leadership in CC to economic success as Obama‘s 
remark that ―the nation that leads in the creation of a clean energy economy will 
be the nation that leads the 21st century global economy‖ shows (White House 
2009). 
On the other side, there is, similar to the ego part, an emphasis on 
strengthening the transatlantic partnership and the sharing of leadership. The US 
sees similar interests of both the Union and the United States. Both are 
industrialized entities with the goal to strike an agreement that is equitable and 
effective. Moreover, the negative attitude towards the US is vanishing and the EU 
does not ‗shame‘ America anymore due to the change of office. The survey results 
show that only a – although narrow – minority of ‗outsiders‘ perceive a 
competition for leadership between the present US government and the EU, 
illustrating that transatlantic role competition is ‗not as bad as all that‘. Moreover, 
several diplomats point to the opportunities about mutual ―future leadership by the 
US and the EU‖ (Japan) and see the climate regime benefiting from the EU-US 
cooperation (Indonesia).   
6.2.2 The multilateralist element – congruence  
Others undisputedly share the self-image of the EU as a committed multilateralist. 
The Union‘s effective and farsighted cooperation with different countries is 
underlined (Japan). Bilateral cooperation and regional partnerships with the EU 
are seen as beneficial and the Union is perceived as a stimulator for cooperation 
(Indonesia). Often, the EU‘s character as a 27-MS entity where multilateral 
cooperation is ‗business-as-usual‘ is seen as the reason for the ‗natural‘ inclination 
towards multilateral approaches. This has also been noticed as a bargaining 
advantage in international negotiations (Japan). What might be part of an 
explanation of why the Union is viewed as an advocate of multilateralism is the 
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fact that the negotiations on CC are multilateral per se and that environmental 
problems are often transnational (Kremenyuk & Lang 1993).  
6.2.3 The coherence element – struggling despite increased 
consistency? 
The Union‘s self-consciousness to represent a coherent outside in CC negotiations 
is largely shared by outsiders. There is agreement that the EU succeeds to 
negotiate as a block and that its positions are well-developed and coordinated 
reflecting that its negotiation behaviour can ―be very effective‖ (UNEP; 
Venezuela). At first glance, a clear majority of interviewees thus regards the EU 
to speak with a ‗single voice‘ in climate negotiations. Also, this perception applies 
for ―other political fora related to climate change‖ (China). Third state 
representatives recognize that in CC matters ―a few decades ago each member 
states had a lot of power but recently [the] EU integrates to the one single EU‖ 
(Japan). However, this matching picture is somewhat spoiled by experts from 
Belarus and the Dominican Republic who do not see the EU to act coherently on 
the international stage. When taking a closer look at the empirical material, this 
critical perception on EU coherence is, although ambivalently, shared by many 
third countries.  
On the one hand, the diplomat representing the US, for example, generally 
views the Union as a coherent actor with no grave inconsistencies in its behaviour. 
On the other hand, there is the perception of EU internal wrangling as the 
different MS all have different national interests in CC (US, Japan, Indonesia, 
UNEP). Also, the institutional setup of the EU is named as an obstacle to a 
consistent approach since it implies limits for EU competences on CC (cf. 2.1.1). 
The interplay between the institutional arrangements and differing national 
interests add to the complexities for coherent and effective bargaining. For 
example, the linkage between the institution of the Presidency and national 
politics has an impact on the outside-coherence of the EU: ―Depending on the 
Presidency, [the EU] can be very effective. If the Presidency is held by a country 
whose national interest differs from the majority or the EU leaders in CC, it can 
be problematic‖ (UNEP). In this sense, the underlying struggle within the EU for 
more consistency is clearly recognized by the interviewees. The Union is seen as 
an entity, but sometimes the perception of the EU as a mere combination of its 
MS is revealed in the data. The EU ―has a single voice‖ but occasionally member 
states add some cacophony to that voice. ―It‘s difficult for other countries to 
understand the differences of opinions of every member state. And we think 
there‘s a difference in the thinking of every member state‖ (Japan).  
In general, this ambivalence may point to a misunderstanding of the EU‘s 
complex political structure. As the interviewees form Japan and Indonesia admit, 
the decision-making processes within the EU are all but easy to see through. The 
lack of transparency in the decision-making processes is widely seen as 
complicating things unnecessarily. With it comes the classic Kissinger-question of 
who to call when to talk to Europe, as third states ―sometimes see difficulties in 
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which person we should propose our idea to in the EU decision making process‖ 
(Japan). 
However, the EU decision-making process is not necessarily seen as a 
difficulty: ―If there is any delay [due to the complex decision making] we don‘t 
see this as an obstacle‖ (Indonesia). The reason for this may lie in the possibility 
to exploit this ‗weakness‘ of the Union‘s negotiating stance. Some interviewees 
admit that it is beneficial to find out about the differences within the EU and then 
try to impinge on certain MS to get closer to one‘s own position.  
In the context of the negotiation behaviour of the EU, the Union has constrains 
due to its negotiation setup which is ―disadvantage in [that] it prevents agility. The 
EU cannot move quickly‖ (UNEP). Especially in the final negotiating phase this 
immobility is attributed to the EU (Japan, US). The increased number of MS has 
contributed to this. If the agenda changes and decision have to be made fast, the 
EU is seen as to be taken by surprise despite rigorous preparation (cf. Gupta & 
Van der Grjip 2000:78).  
Despite the asseverations of increased flexibility on part of EU interviewees, 
the EU decision-making process and the EU‘s complex institutional design 
contributes to a certain extent of incoherence. Yet, there is a majority of third state 
actors that see improvements in the Union‘s coherence and acknowledge that it 
increasingly speaks with a single voice. 
6.2.4 The element of credibility – hypocritical or honest? 
Generally, the EU is seen as a legitimate actor in the negotiations. Its leadership is 
therefore due in the eyes of others and matches with the Union‘s self-image. Yet, 
the picture is more complex as there are deviations in perception about the 
credibility of the EU in CC matters.  
On the one hand, developed countries generally commend that the Union 
―preaches with the good example‖ and is ―doing what it says and proposes‖ 
(Switzerland). This holds especially true for those states close to the EU (Iceland, 
Switzerland). Europe is regarded as using legitimate measures to pursue its 
climate goals and observers assign it to negotiate ―credibly, faithfully and 
professionally‖ while ―following [the] rules of the game‖ (UNEP). This reasoning 
thus corresponds well to the leadership perception that the Union has of itself. It 
highlights an effective directional leadership that repays in the form of credibility.  
On the other hand, there is a concern on side of some DCs that the EU does 
not act in a credible way. The ―EU should be as good as its words‖ (China) in its 
CC approach, indicating that the Union‘s rhetoric is not followed by serious 
action. This signifies the often-discussed domestic implementation difficulties of 
the EU (Lacaste et. al. 2007). There are ―too little commitments‖ (Namibia) from 
the Union. And although the EU is ―politically (…) committed‖ to ―reasonable  
targets‖ it is ―not when negotiating‖ (ibid.). In the same direction, Venezuela 
assesses the EU as acting not reliable. This is a severe blow to the self-image of 
the Union: This impression implies that the EU has not more to offer than warm 
words and may in the long-run point towards a severe damage of the Union‘s 
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leadership capabilities. To put it somewhat bluntly, this might be coined as the 
contradistinction of the essence of the Union‘s leadership: an unreliable hypocrite 
that bases its leadership on mere rhetoric using ―the luxury of being greener than 
it is‖ (Gupta & Van der Grijp 2000:77). 
Although this result ought not to be underestimated, there are some indications 
not to overvalue this finding. Firstly, the ‗accusation‘ of hypocrisy has been 
voiced already a decade ago by some less developed states without having serious 
influence on the leadership role of the EU (Gupta & Van der Grijp 2000:74). In 
fact, the EU apparently gained leadership during the Kyoto negotiations and is 
still perceived as a leader on CC. Secondly, the empirical data shows that apart 
from China no other state or observer regards the Union to have lost status or 
standing in global CC politics. Indeed, it is only a minority of developing 
countries that positions the EU close to hypocrisy. Thirdly, there is a consensual 
perception that the EU has gained or not lost in leadership since the Kyoto deal. 
Its leadership has been ―strong and consistent - growing over time‖ (UNEP) 
despite its rather weak performance in the last COP. The leadership of the Union 
is portrayed as very consistent as ―it doesn‘t go up and down year by year‖ 
(Indonesia). Hence, all this absorbs the impression of an ―empty‖ leader.  
6.2.5 The element of responsibility – too ‗good‘ to be true?   
Outsiders have a rather nuanced picture of the Union‘s self-image as a ‗good‘ or 
‗responsible guy‘. It is not necessarily seen as being more moral than other 
parties, but there are signals from third party actors that assign the EU as amicable 
or good-natured. This assessment is found in both developed as well as DCs 
perceptions.  
Japan, for example, notices that the EU has been a partner for developing and 
LDCs in Africa and tries to help African countries to achieve better energy 
efficiency. However, this engagement is not based on pure altruism or 
commitment to responsibility. Behind it is ―not only green political reason. Of 
course, EU businesses have an interest in business opportunities‖ (Japan). This 
implies that the EU is not primarily acting on moral grounds. Indeed, all experts 
see the Union to pursue ―its very own interests‖ in the CC negotiations. These 
interests range from hard national-interest-inclined competitive advantages 
(Japan, US) to more milieu goal
36
 oriented interests that ―will help the EU to get 
high status in the world‖ (China). In comparison to other actors there is not seen 
any bigger disparity as ―all countries pursue their own interests while trying to 
achieve some common goal. So [the EU] is no different than most countries or 
blocks‖ (UNEP).  
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 In Wolfers (1963) classical terminology, possession goals correlate to short-term national interests of an actor. 
It aims at gains or the preservation of things to the expense of other actors. Actors that pursue milieu goals ―are 
out not to defend or increase possessions they hold to the exclusion of others, but aim instead at shaping 
conditions beyond their national boundaries‖ (ibid.:74). 
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On part of the less developed countries, Indonesia highlights that ―the EU is 
very supportive. They assist us in getting a better understanding‖ of CC. Gestures 
to help the DCs and the exemplary cooperation form a perception of the EU as a 
responsible player that reaffirms the Union‘s self-image. However, the perception 
is ambivalent among DCs. While the SIDS country (Dominican Republic) shares 
the image, and remarks that the Union has ―dedicated much economic resources 
to help developing countries in Latin America; Africa and Asia‖, some DCs do 
diverge severely from this image. In Namibia the EU‘s stance on CC is ―not very 
much appreciated‖. Moreover, Argentina, Belarus, and Namibia feel some 
ignorance from the EU. This is grounded on the perceived ―partly negative‖ 
attitude of the EU towards these countries‘ proposals. What adds to that picture is 
that the EU has ―a rather bad‖ status or standing in the eyes of the African 
representative. Thus, the picture of Africa as the ‗best buddy‘ of the EU in ICN 
seems not to be shared by the Namibian counterpart.  
One of the reasons behind this perception may be based on misunderstandings 
between the developing and the developed world. The EU ―needs to understand 
and be more patient with the developing and LDCs to go their own path of 
sustainable development‖ (Indonesia). There is a view that the burden which the 
DCs have to bear is heavier than that of the developed countries. Although the EU 
affirms this in its rhetoric and its self-image in general, it is pointed out as a 
critical misunderstanding between the EU and the less developed states. It seems 
that there is a perceived mismatch on views of the environment and the CC 
problematic. Whereas the Union emphasizes environmental protection and 
sustainable development, DCs ―cannot only think about the environment, not only 
GHG. We have to think of our people‖ (ibid.). Thus, there is a misperception in 
objectives and priorities. The goal to achieve the 2°C target is most important for 
the Union, whereas for DCs it is also the economic ―development under adaption 
of climate change‖ (China). What seems to annoy third party actors is that 
―sometimes the Union makes regulations that, for us it seems, they don‘t have 
much time, or they don‘t have enough information about the consequences for 
developing countries‖ (Indonesia). These EU measures have an outreach on other 
states and are often coupled to a perception of ‗green‘ protectionism. An example 
is European consideration to penalize imports from countries with softer climate 
policy regarding products such as steel and cement, whose manufacture generates 
a lot of GHG emissions. Hence, there are some DCs (Argentina, Venezuela, 
Indonesia, China) that perceive certain EU climate policy illegitimate especially if 
it has an impact on trade access. 
However, what correlates fairly to the EU‘s ‗good guy‘ image is that the EU is 
acknowledged by developing countries as ―an example for the developed 
countries to deal with climate change‖ (China). Its policies are perceived as being 
directed to ―enhance capacity building for climate change in developing 
countries‖ (ibid.). Also, misunderstandings between the EU and the DCs 
apparently seem to decrease: ―Now, the EU can understand about the position of 
developing countries, of the G-77 plus China. They give us even good 
explanations. The EU is more open about the positions of the developing 
countries in general‖ (Indonesia). All this indicates that the EU might eventually 
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gain a ‗responsible‘ image in the eyes of others. However this image is painted 
with different nuances of impressions that indicate a ‗restricted‘ good guy image. 
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7 Concluding Remarks – Making the 
Mosaics a Picture  
The analysis confirms that the Union theoretically qualifies for the role as a leader 
as it complies with the definition laid out in Chapter 2. In a competitive setting, 
the EU has followers that it consistently leads via largely positive influence 
towards a common good: strengthened climate protection (cf. Oberthür 2007:78). 
On the empirical level, the comparison of the ego and alter part of the role 
conceptions also indicates clearly that the EU indeed plays the role as a leader in 
global climate change politics. The construction of the Union‘s self and the 
perception of non-EU outsiders both largely confirm and mutually construct this 
role. This is first of all surprising given its problems concerning the complex 
institutional architecture, internal disparities with a cacophony of 27 different 
voices, and the difficulties associated with mixed competence. Thus, since the 
mere ―aspiration to leadership might well be regarded as perverse‖ (Bretherton & 
Vogler 2006:101), the success for taking on a leader role may be described as an 
achievement against (almost) all odds. However, much of the leadership in the 
post-Kyoto process still stems from the abdication of CC leadership by the US 
after it refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol. In the eyes of others, the Union ―has 
cleverly taken the momentum for leadership‖ (Indonesia), but even sustained and 
yet increased its leadership qualities.  
However, by taking a closer look at the role and its elements, the leadership-
role of the EU is not clear-cut but rather subject to certain constraints. The flies in 
the leadership-ointment are based on some ambivalent assessments of the Union‘s 
leadership construction by ‗others‘. Apart from the perception of the EU as a 
multilateralist leader, there is no clear congruence of the ego and alter part when 
the constituting images are compared. Despite a fairly strong tendency towards 
convergence of ego and alter part, the EU is not entirely seen as important, 
coherent, credible, and moral as it conceptualizes itself.  
Nevertheless, these obstacles in perceptions are not able to spoil the leadership 
of the EU aggravatingly. The EU in climate policy may therefore be described as 
a genuine but somewhat restricted green giant (cf. Elgström 2007b:456). Yet, in 
contrast to other negotiations or policy areas, the EU not only has the ambition to 
play a leader role in CC, but is also expected to play this role by others. It thus 
plays the leader role stronger and performs better than in other negotiation settings 
(ibid.). The potential for playing such a comparatively strong role in other policy 
areas are nevertheless rather limited due to the unique situation of ‗hegemonic 
absence‘ from the US. Still, as indicated in the empirical material, the potential for 
the EU to learn from this experience as a green leader may in the long-run result 
in genuine leader roles in areas associated with CC. 
  53 
To sustain its leader role on CC in the future, with the US being either a 
competitor or companion, the EU needs to ensure that its internal practices and 
processes work more smoothly. With the accession of the eastern European 
countries in 2004 and 2007, the Union‘s decision-making has become exceedingly 
complex and cumbersome. This may reduce the ―EU's flexibility and 
opportunities to lead by example at future global CC negotiations‖ (Lacaste et. al. 
2007:226). A recent example for this is the stalled EU position at COP14 due to 
the halted ratification of the Climate and Energy Package and the ‗waiting for 
Obama‘. An obvious solution would be the coming into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which would facilitate flexibility. Still, the Union did succeed to lead 
consistently on CC despite these setbacks. It remains to be seen if the Union will 
succeed as a leader although it is hampered under the current decision-making 
procedures. It seems as if the Union incorporated an old wisdom, which works 
fine so far: ―divide and rule, a sound motto. Unite and lead, a better one‖ 
(Goethe).  
One last finding needs some special attention. The empirical analysis of the 
leader performance suggests that the EU relies on a ‗soft‘ approach to perform its 
role as a green giant. Based on its general economic and political weight, the EU 
primarily exerts directional leadership added up with instrumental methods. This 
combination of leadership modes ultimately emphasizes leading by example. It is 
well associated with the non-coercive moulding of others‘ perceptions through 
diffusion of its leader-images and the intention to inspire third countries through 
its policies. Hence, this leadership strategy correlates with the conception of the 
EU as a normative power that pursues to shape conceptions of what is normal in 
international CC politics (Manners 2002). Or as Nicolaidis and Howse (2002: 
774) coin it: to be a normative power, the EU must lead by example. Indeed, not 
only the quest for international status or economic interests, but also the aspiration 
to gain a unique identity can be detected in the motivations for leadership. The 
leader role of the EU in CC ―is a fantastic subject for the EU to develop its own 
identity and its foreign policy. It‘s obvious. Why? We are the good guys, we are 
the good guys for once‖ (COM). This correlates well with the detected role of the 
Union as a ‗responsible‘ leader. The European emphasis on equity and 
responsibility to act and aid developing countries in CC policy is infused 
throughout European foreign policy on global climate change and it seems that 
international environmental equity as a norm became a well-established part of 
the EU foreign policy objective (Harris 2007c:376). Through the incorporated 
norm of international environmental equity in the EU policy on CC the EU can 
influence other actors through its ‗soft‘ leadership strategy by means of norm 
diffusion. Theoretically, the Union thus can be considered as pursuing normative 
power in CC. Further studies on CC that examine this issue in detail may be an 
interesting field of research on the European identity (cf. Lightfoot & Burchell 
2005, Falkner 2006).  
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8 Executive Summary 
This study examines the notion of the European Union (EU) being a leader on 
global climate change (CC), an area where the Union since the 1990ies has made 
considerable efforts to present itself as forerunner. With a focus on the current 
post-Kyoto climate negotiations at UN-level, the present paper analyzes (1) 
whether the EU can indeed be described playing a leader-role in CC politics and 
(2) how the leader-role is (mutually) constructed by the EU and non-EU players at 
the negotiations. In order to make a thorough assessment of the first question, the 
construction of the EU‘s leader-role is scrutinized by applying a distinct role-
theoretical framework.  
Role-theory is a sound approach to understand and examine the construction 
of the EU‘s leadership role as it takes into account the self-representation of the 
Union and the perceptions of this role by ‗outsiders‘ (non-EU actors participating 
in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
negotiations). The underlying assumption here is that the leader role is shaped in a 
circular process between the self-perception (ego) and the expectations of others 
(alter). The basis for this proceeding is that according to leadership theory, a 
leader can only be a genuine leader if it is perceived as such by others. It is 
surprising that, to date, a role-theoretical approach has not been used in the 
current setting as it can add considerably to the academic debate. 
In order to evaluate the construction of the EU‘s leader-role and its 
assessment, unique data obtained from interviews and a qualitative survey along 
with official documentation are used. This data is processed by means of a 
specific qualitative textual analysis in order to extract and examine the 
perceptions of both EU (ego) and non-EU diplomats (alter) and/or negotiators. 
The analysis reveals that the EU pursues three specific leadership modes: 
structural, instrumental and directional leadership. A structural leader uses its 
political and economic clout to get others to follow. In the context of climate 
change, economic resources as well as current and potential future emissions build 
the power base for a structural EU. The EU as an instrumental leader exercises 
leadership by means of political skill and imagination, diplomatic insight, and an 
ability to foster ‗winning coalitions‘. Directional leadership of the EU means to 
set domestic examples and through that influencing the behavior of other actors 
by moulding their expectations. The EU combines these ways of leading, but its 
emphasis is on the third mode of leadership, making it a ―soft leadership‖ 
performance that aims at changing ‗outsiders‘ perceptions of EU leadership. This 
role-performance is acknowledged and confirmed by both the alter and ego part of 
the role.    
Through analysis of the empirical material, the EU‘s leader-role can be 
dissected into five constituting and recurrent elements (sub-roles) of the 
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(overarching) leader-role. The role is shaped by its specific emphasis on (1) 
importance, (2) multilateralism, (3) coherence, (4) credibility and (5) 
responsibility. Along these elements the perceptions and expectations of ‗others‘ 
are compared to those of the EU. The general finding is that the content of these 
role-constituents are mostly shared between the EU and ‗outsiders‘. However, 
there are some deviations in the perceptions. 
In more detail, the EU is perceived as an important actor by both EU and non-
EU diplomats. A potential role-competition for leadership or sharing of leadership 
between the US and the EU is perceived by all interviewees and respondents. 
However, especially ‗major players‘ like the US, China and Japan see the EU not 
as influential as it sees itself. 
While the perception of the EU as being a multilateral leader is shared without 
differences between ego and alter, the role of the EU as a coherent leader is not 
completely congruent. The EU perceives itself as a cohesive player at the 
negotiations but also admitting some deficiencies due to a complex internal 
decision-making process encompassing the opinions of 27 member states. This is 
resulting in inflexibility at the negotiations. The alter part of this sub-role 
acknowledges the EU‘s attempts for presenting a ‗single European voice‘ but 
expects generally more coherence and more transparency.  
The EU is largely seen as being a credible leader by both ‗others‘ and the EU, 
however, the EU tends to see itself as exclusively credible whereas some ‗others‘, 
primarily developing countries perceive the Union as occasionally hypocritical.  
Finally, the EU regards itself as a ‗good guy‘ and responsible player that 
unlike most other industrialized actors is committed to help developing countries 
and acknowledges its ‗guilt‘ on causing CC. ‗Others‘ face misunderstandings 
about this role as the Union is not necessarily seen as being ‗good‘ or more moral 
than other developed countries. However, by and large, the EU is perceived as 
being committed to assist the less developed world in efforts to mitigate and adopt 
to CC.  
In conclusion, despite some deviations between ego and alter part on the 
elements of the leader role, there is a strong tendency towards convergence 
indicating that the EU is indeed mutually constructed as a leader. Moreover, the 
role performance of the EU is perceived by others and by the EU itself as 
matching a leader-role with an emphasis on ‗soft‘ measures. The EU may 
therefore, I argue, be characterized as a strong and genuine but somewhat 
restricted leader in the climate regime. This is a rather surprising result that 
contrasts the difficulties of the Union to play a leading role in other negotiation 
settings or international regimes.   
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Primary Sources 
 
Interviewee/ Respondent Coalition/ Grouping Date 
Republic of Iceland  Umbrella 23/07/2009 
Republic of Namibia G-77 and China 10/07/2009 
Republic of Indonesia  G-77 and China, ASEAN 01/30/2009 
United States of America Umbrella 01/29/2009 
People‘s Republic of China G-77 and China 06/05/2009 
Japan Umbrella 01/07/2009 
Argentine Republic G-77  09/04/2009 
Dominican Republic AOSIS, G-77 07/04/2009 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela OPEC, G-77 16/05/2009 
Swiss Confederation Environmental Integrity 
Group 
12/06/2009 
Republic of Belarus – 02/07/2009 
United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) 
observer 01/29/2009 
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European Environment Agency (EEA) observer 02/11/2009 
 
The questionnaire can be found at http://www.thesistools.com/?qid=74929&ln=eng, accessed 
12.07.2009. 
 
All interviews and survey results are in my possession.  
Interviewee Date 
European Commission DG Relex 01/28/2009 
European Commission DG Relex 01/23/2009 
Secretariat of the European Council 01/27/2009 
European Commission DG Environment 01/28/2009 
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10 Appendix 
Below are some useful definitions that may facilitate the understanding of the 
reader. 
 
Climate Change (CC) 
This term here refers to climatic changes and their consequences as an effect from 
global warming which result in atmospheric changes connected directly or 
indirectly to human activities. CC has potentially severe impact on ecosystems, 
human societies, security and economies. These impacts range from sea level rise, 
to changing weather conditions characterized by increasingly severe storms, 
floods and droughts, and the side effects of these changes, such as the spread of 
diseases to newly warmed regions or potential conflicts due to water or energy 
resources. While some areas may experience positive effects of a changing 
climate (e.g. extended seasons, larger harvest etc.), others are likely to suffer. This 
makes climate change a global issue that needs to be solved by an international 
effort.  
Science holds that a rise to a maximum of 2° Celsius (above pre-industrial) 
levels should not be exceeded in order to avoid risks of dangerous and irreversible 
changes in the global environment. This is also the position of the EU. In general, 
predictions point to adverse impacts, particularly in parts of the world where 
geographic vulnerability and poverty make adaption difficult or infeasible. The 
recent report of the IPCC indicates that CC is likely to be worse and occur more 
rapidly than predicted, leaving developing and the least developed countries most 
vulnerable to CC consequences. In Europe severe changes may be felt through 
varieties of in the frequency of extreme weather events and precipitation that 
cause droughts in some areas and river floods elsewhere (Harris 2007a:6-10, 
Maslin 2009, IPPC 2007, Commission 2009a). 
Global warming 
This term is often used interchangeably with climate change due to their close 
inter-linkage. According to mainstream science, global warming occurs as a 
consequence of GHG concentration in the atmosphere of the earth. Although not 
exclusively, many of these gases are products of human activity and 
industrialization as these are adding GHGs to the atmosphere. This contribution 
over the natural sources has a discernable impact by increasing global 
temperatures (Harris 2007a:6, Maslin 2009).  
Greenhouse Gases 
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Greenhouse gases include water vapor, carbon dioxide (CO²), Sulphur hexa-
fluroride, methane, nitrous oxide, Perfluro methane PCF-14, CFC-12, HCFC-22, 
and ozone (Maslin 2009:4, 17). The Kyoto protocol to the UNFCCC tackles the 
six first named substances. CO² and methane are by far the most dangerous gas 
for the climate. 
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European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) 
The ETS is the world‘s first carbon emissions trading system starting to operate in 
January 2005. In that year the system covered estimated 12,000 facilities, 
encompassing power generators above 20 MW and other large installations which 
represent just under half of European CO2 emissions. For the international level, a 
linking Directive (2004/101/EC) was passed coupling the JI and CDM 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol to the ETS. As a ‗cap and trade‘ system, the 
scheme relies on national allocations of carbon allowances. Today, the 
Commission allocates certificates to the MS based on a national allocation plan. 
Implementation is still a challenge and initial problems originating from an 
affluence of national allowances were fiercely criticized by environmental NGOs. 
Yet, the ETS has not been exactly a success story (Karlsson & Parker 2008:28). 
But the system seems to perform better in the current phase (2008-2012) (Vogler 
& Bretherton 2006, Schreurs & Tiberghien 2007). 
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